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Executive Summary
In late 2007, U.S. health officials began receiving reports of unexpected allergic-type reactions in pa-
tients undergoing dialysis.1 The reactions were linked to a widely used blood thinner—heparin2—and 
specifically to an adulterant that had been introduced during manufacture of the drug in China.3–5 The 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) believes the adulteration of heparin was an economically 
motivated act—a clear breach of the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain.6  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors work together in a robust system to deliver high-quality 
products, but drug manufacturing and distribution have become increasingly complex in recent years. 
Prescription and over-the-counter (OTC) medications originate in factories all over the world, moving 
into the American marketplace through supply chains that can involve numerous processing plants, 
manufacturers, suppliers, brokers, packagers and distributors.  
The number of drug products made outside of the United States doubled from 2001 to 2008, accord-
ing to FDA estimates.7 The FDA estimates that up to 40 percent of finished drugs used by U.S. patients 
is manufactured abroad,8,9 and 80 percent of active ingredients and bulk chemicals used in U.S. drugs 
comes from foreign countries.10 Increasingly, the United States relies on drug manufacturing in devel-
oping countries—mainly China and India. Globalization, increased outsourcing of manufacturing, the 
complexity of pharmaceutical distribution and the existence of criminal actors willing to capitalize on 
supply chain weaknesses has created the potential for counterfeit or substandard medicines to enter the 
system and reach patients. As evidenced by the adulteration of heparin and other case studies outlined 
in this report, these rare but potentially serious events can have grave consequences.
For economic reasons, the movement of manufacturing from the United States to foreign countries is 
likely to continue. However, industry and regulatory bodies have failed to adapt adequately to these 
changing circumstances. 
Drawing on public documents, peer-reviewed publications and dozens of interviews with industry stake-
holders, regulators and supply chain experts, this Pew Health Group white paper provides an overview 
of the complex, modern pharmaceutical supply chain and its risks from manufacturing through distri-
bution of the finished drug. A discussion draft of this document was developed to inform a Pew Health 
Group stakeholder conference on ensuring the safety of the U.S. drug supply that was held on March 14 
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eventually being sold to legitimate pharmacies and, ultimately, to patients.17 Pharmaceutical cargo theft is 
substantial, and much of the stolen product is never recovered. Manufacturers, wholesalers and pharma-
cies have taken steps to secure the distribution pipeline, but risks persist. No national system exists for 
tracing the provenance of finished drugs as they are bought and sold. Requirements for drug pedigrees 
and wholesaler licensure vary widely among states. Drug distribution tracking and regulation must be 
improved; methods of documenting the movement of drugs at the individual package level have been at-
tracting support, and a universal system should be implemented. Legislators, the FDA, consumer organi-
zations and industry recognize the need to strengthen control of the pharmaceutical supply to safeguard 
public health. Based on the outcomes of Pew’s stakeholder conference, as well as extensive review of the 
public literature and background interviews, this paper concludes that Congress must institute reforms 
to ensure that the FDA’s oversight of overseas manufacturing is increased, and that industry is held 
accountable for the security and safety of increasingly globalized and outsourced supply chains. This 
report makes the following key policy recommendations:
ensure meaningful oversight and quality management of globalized pharmaceutical  
manufacturing
■  Require 21st-century quality systems to protect drug safety through statute and regulation
■  Strengthen industry oversight of contract manufacturers and suppliers
■   Enhance documentation and transparency of upstream manufacturing supply chains through 
legal requirements
■  Improve testing standards
eliminate barriers to Fda oversight
■  Increase FDA oversight of overseas manufacturing
■  Ensure adequate FDA resources
■  Improve the FDA’s infrastructure and tracking systems
■  Strengthen oversight of drugs and bulk drug substances at import
■  Empower the FDA with regulatory authorities it needs to fulfill its mission 
■   Strengthen the FDA’s enforcement ability through stronger penalties and clearer accountability 
for industry
■  Improve FDA access to information from other regulatory bodies and industry
Secure pharmaceutical distribution
■  Improve drug distribution security through a federal serialization and verification system
■  Strengthen wholesaler regulation and oversight
and 15, 2011, in Washington, D.C. Conference participants included leadership from the FDA, the Unit-
ed States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP), major pharmaceutical manufacturing and distribution trade 
associations, pharmacy organizations and medical professional groups, individual supply chain experts 
and consumer organizations.  This paper has now been revised to incorporate outcomes and stakeholder 
discussion from that meeting.
This report concludes that more can—and must—be done to ensure the safety of “upstream” phar-
maceutical manufacturing (chapter 1), to provide the FDA with essential authorities and resources to 
exercise effective oversight (chapter 2) and to improve the security of “downstream” pharmaceutical 
distribution (chapter 3).
In a world where drug manufacturing is increasingly outsourced and offshored, robust supply chain 
management is critical.  Pharmaceutical companies have the ultimate responsibility for drug quality and 
safety, but some companies may not be adequately verifying the quality of their suppliers.11,12 Ensuring 
drug-ingredient manufacturers meet quality standards is critical to ensuring the quality of the product 
itself. However, chapter 1 reviews numerous situations in which foreign producers and traders have 
misrepresented the source drug ingredients from the United States and other purchasers, in some cases 
concealing substandard products that harmed consumers. It is essential that manufacturers look beyond 
current manufacturing quality standards (known as good manufacturing practices, or GMPs) in their 
own facilities to ensure appropriate supplier qualification, through risk-based assessments, quality agree-
ments and physical audits, where appropriate.
The FDA and its counterpart agencies worldwide monitor the quality and safety of drug manufactur-
ing by inspecting plants and validating compliance with GMPs. However, the FDA lacks the resources, 
capacity and authority to effectively inspect foreign facilities and assess risk. In contrast with U.S. manu-
facturing facilities, which are inspected every two to three years, the FDA currently inspects foreign 
facilities once every nine years on average.13 Improved oversight of foreign manufacturing is essential 
and will require increased resources for the FDA, some of which could be obtained through industry 
fees. In addition, the agency will have to make additional use of third-party inspections, including those 
by other regulators and, potentially, private entities. The FDA also requires certain new authorities to en-
able effective oversight and must more effectively use its existing authorities and resources. The agency 
should have the power to mandate recalls, subpoena witnesses and documents and destroy at the border 
any products that present public safety risks. In the long term, ameliorating risks to the U.S. and global 
drug supply requires international cooperation, harmonization of standards and steps to improve the 
capacity of regulatory bodies in the developing countries where manufacturing increasingly takes place.
The movement of finished drugs from manufacturer to the consumer is also a complex process involv-
ing many intermediate players. The past decade has seen several instances of adulterated and counterfeit 
drugs infiltrating U.S. distribution. In 2002, counterfeit vials of the anemia drug Epogen® entered the 
distribution supply chain through licensed wholesalers and were sold by U.S. pharmacies.14–16 A ship-
ment of 129,000 vials of insulin, stolen in June 2009, was stored under unknown conditions before 
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methodology 
This white paper provides an overview of the complex, modern pharmaceutical supply chain from 
manufacturing through distribution of the finished drug, and advances proposed policy solutions to 
help reduce the risks of counterfeit, adulterated and substandard drugs. It was prepared to inform, and 
incorporates the outcomes of, a Pew Health Group stakeholder conference on policy reforms to ensure 
the safety of the U.S. pharmaceutical supply, held on March 14 and 15, 2011, in Washington, D.C. 
The paper draws on publicly available sources of information, including FDA documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office reports, Congressional testimony, peer-reviewed journal articles and 
commercial publications, as well as in-depth background interviews with a wide range of supply chain 
experts and stakeholders. Roundtable participants included representatives of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), state regulators, the United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP), pharmaceu-
tical manufacturing and distribution trade associations, the retail pharmacy industry, medical and phar-
macy professional associations, consumer groups and individual supply chain experts. The final paper 
has been reviewed by nine external reviewers. 
Complete lists of roundtable participants, expert interviews and reviewers, as well as the conference 
agenda, are appended. Video of the conference presentations and discussions is available on the Pew 
Prescription Project website.
The conclusions and recommendations herein are those of The Pew Charitable Trusts and may not 
reflect those of individual sources, reviewers, or roundtable participants.
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introduction and Background
U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors work together in a robust system that delivers 
high-quality products. Nevertheless, complex supply chains and increased reliance on outsourced manu-
facturing create the potential for counterfeit or substandard medicines to enter the system and reach 
patients. The adulteration of the commonly used blood thinner heparin, outlined below, is a sentinel 
failure that demonstrates the weaknesses of today’s pharmaceutical supply chains—particularly the risks 
of an increasing reliance on production outside the United States without sufficient levels of oversight. 
Heparin and the other case studies outlined in this paper have also become a catalyst for reform. The 
U.S. Congress, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the pharmaceutical industry and other 
organizations have renewed their commitments to remedy existing weaknesses. This white paper seeks to 
inform these efforts by presenting a holistic picture of the pharmaceutical supply chain and its problems 
(illustrated by case studies), and to propose a set of meaningful reforms that will better protect patients.
The exact prevalence of substandard* and counterfeit drugs in the United States and elsewhere is not 
known. The FDA estimated in 2004 that less than 1 percent of drugs in the United States are counter-
feit.18 For prescription drugs alone, even a fraction of 1 percent of the nearly four billion prescriptions 
filled in 201019 would still equate to millions of dispensed medications. It should be noted that differing 
definitions of “counterfeit” complicate the use of the term as it applies to pharmaceuticals,† with some 
stakeholders concerned that overly broad application of intellectual property regimes may impede global 
access to medicines.20,21,‡ The World Health Organization’s International Medical Products Anti-Counter-
feiting Taskforce (IMPACT) has estimated that fake drugs may account for approximately 30 percent of 
the market in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America.22 Drug contamination, adulteration or the inser-
tion of counterfeits can occur at any point during manufacturing or distribution, from the sourcing of 
* Substandard medicines are legitimately marketed products that contain adulterants or improper amounts of active ingredients, or were compromised by 
improper manufacturing, handling and storage. Whether the result of deliberate or unintentional acts, substandard products have the potential to cause 
serious harm or to deny patients the therapy they need to preserve health or life.
† For the purposes of this report, the term counterfeit is used to apply to finished drugs only, consistent with U.S. statute:
“…a drug which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or 
device, or any likeness thereof, of a drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, 
processed, packed, or distributed such drug and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been packed or 
distributed by, such other drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor.” [21 U.S.C. 321 (g)(2)]
Thus, the contamination of heparin (see case study 1), which involved a presumed act of economically motivated adulteration and deliberate 
misrepresentation of an ingredient, resulted in an adulterated drug, not a counterfeit one. 
‡ For example, regulatory authorities in Europe have seized drugs within their customs zones that they consider to be in violation of European intellectual 
property laws, even when those drugs are in transit to developing countries and are considered by some to be lawful generics in their country of destination.
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raw ingredients through the delivery of a finished drug to the patient (see figure 1). Substandard and 
counterfeit products may reach patients through legitimate supply chains as happened with heparin (see 
case study 1) or through illicit routes. 
Every step in the complex pathway of the pharmaceutical supply chain—from raw materials (see sidebar 
1) to finished products to patient delivery—is an opportunity for adulteration. A typical pharmaceutical 
supply chain might proceed as follows: raw materials for a drug’s active ingredient are purchased from 
suppliers and undergo initial processing. Processed raw materials then move to an active active-ingre-
dient manufacturing site, sometimes through consolidators or brokers. This site prepares the finished 
active ingredient and sends it to another plant, where active and inactive ingredients, provided by yet 
other suppliers, are combined to create the finished drug. After the finished drug is packaged and enters 
distribution, it may change hands between brokers and wholesalers, be repackaged into different quan-
tities and then stored for periods of time. Eventually, the product arrives at hospitals, pharmacies and 
doctors’ offices, where it is dispensed to patients. 
Several factors offer opportunities to adulterate a product or ignore quality controls (see sidebar 2). In 
regions where regulation, compliance and vigilance are weak, the quest for lower-cost materials can 
drive the trade of substandard or falsified drug ingredients. These may be introduced into manufacturing 
processes or sold as legitimate products by distributors and brokers. In countries with less developed 
regulatory systems than that of the United States, manufacturing standards may also be less rigorous—or 
Figure 1
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less rigorously observed. Those same countries receive much less FDA oversight than U.S. manufac-
turing facilities, creating additional potential for poor quality medicines to reach U.S. consumers (see 
section 1.3).
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) penalizes adulteration, misbranding and counter-
feiting at a maximum of $10,000 or three years in prison.23 These penalties may be too low to present 
meaningful deterrents to violations and crime, particularly for pharmaceutical counterfeiting, which is 
additionally incentivized by high profitability. By one estimate, the return on counterfeit prescription 
drugs may be 10 times greater than that of the sale of illegal narcotics.24 In the United States, the penal-
ties for trafficking drugs such as heroin and cocaine can have jail sentences up to life and fines in the 
millions of dollars.25 Although counterfeiting can be prosecuted under trademark law, with a maximum 
sentence of 10 years, the FDCA, with its lower penalties, is the most common statute used for prosecut-
ing counterfeit drug cases.26 
The FDA regulates many thousands of drugs and medical devices intended for the U.S. market. The 
various entities involved in the manufacture of these products may be located within U.S. borders, or 
partly or completely overseas—and the overseas component is growing. The United States imported 393 
million kilograms of pharmaceuticals and medicines in 2009 (see section 1.2.1).* FDA-regulated imports 
represented 20 million shipments into the United States in 2010, a threefold increase over 10 years.27 
Human drugs, though a small percentage of the total, amounted to over 300,000 shipments of pharma-
ceuticals in 2007, more than double the volume in 2002.28 The number of foreign establishments named 
in U.S. drug marketing applications more than doubled over a seven-year period (779 vs. 2,019 in years 
2002 and 2008, respectively).29 Imported drugs and their ingredients, each with intricate manufactur-
ing, packaging and distribution supply chains, are made at thousands of sites around the world,30 and 
arrive at any one of hundreds of U.S. points of entry every day.31
* From a dataset provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division.
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unassessable.42,43 Once the products were removed from the market, reports of unusual adverse reactions 
essentially ceased.44 It was later discovered that the adulteration of heparin had occurred during manu-
facture in China.45 
SIdeBar 1
CoMPonentS oF a druG ProduCt
A finished drug, also known as a drug product, may take many forms, including tablets, capsules, 
injectables, ointments or solutions. Drug products contain both active and inactive ingredients. 
Inactive ingredients (also called inert ingredients or excipients) act as carriers for the active compo-
nents, and include syrups, binding agents and fillers for tablets, capsule coatings, sweeteners and 
colorings, as well as solutions used in the formulation of injectable products. Some are specifically 
processed for use in pharmaceutical products, but many are not, and have applications in other 
market sectors. Excipients often make up the bulk of a finished drug product, while representing 
just a fraction of its value. Excipients have no therapeutic effect of their own, but can significantly  
affect the absorption of drugs by the body. As with any other ingredient, adulterated or substan-
dard excipients can be harmful to patients. 
A drug product’s therapeutic effect comes from its active pharmaceutical ingredient (API).32 Materi-
als in bulk form that become either the API or the finished drug when manufacturing is complete 
are called bulk drug substances.33 In many cases, the terms API and bulk drug substance are used 
interchangeably. Traditional small-molecule APIs may be synthesized by multistep chemical reac-
tions and a series of purification/isolation steps or through synthetic modifications to a naturally 
occurring structure. APIs may also be derived from animal or plant sources or produced through 
biotechnology.34 According to the FDA and international guidance, an API must be manufactured 
in accordance with good manufacturing practices (see sidebar 2) and under procedures that ensure 
the product meets specifications35 that are set by industry in a marketing application or exist in pub-
lic monographs. Substantial deviation from the approved set of conditions and procedures could 
prevent assurance of API quality and purity,36 which could result in harm to patients. Because APIs 
are the most therapeutically important (and often the most expensive) drug ingredients, industry 
and regulatory bodies often give them greater, and sometimes exclusive, scrutiny over inactive 
ingredients in terms of oversight of manufacturing processes. 
Case study 1: Adulteration of heparin
In late 2007, health authorities at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the 
FDA began receiving reports of unexpected allergic-type reactions and hypotension in patients undergo-
ing dialysis.37 Reported events sharply increased from December 2007 to January 2008, a clear spike 
over baseline levels in 2007 and the first eight months of 2008 (figure 2). The events were subsequently 
linked to heparin, a widely used blood thinner made by Baxter International Inc.38 Additional analysis 
led to the identification of oversulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), a substance that standard tests were 
unable to detect39 and whose biological properties can cause the reported reactions.40 Although the avail-
able data do not permit clear determination of causality for any individual death, the FDA examined a 
subset of 574 adverse events, including 68 deaths, submitted between January 1, 2008, and March 31, 
2008—a period that corresponded with the heaviest reporting.41 The FDA determined that three deaths 
were likely caused by OSCS, six were possibly caused by the adulterant, 24 were unlikely and 35 were 
* SPL-CZ is a joint venture of Wisconsin-based Scientific Protein Laboratories (SPL) and Techpool Bio-Pharma Co. Ltd. SPL had provided Baxter with 
heparin active ingredient prior to opening its Changzhou plant.
† There are other types of heparin products, including premixed IV bags and prefilled syringes.
Source: FDA Adverse Event Reporting System.46 Also includes reports that did not specify a month and were assigned to January of that 
calendar year.
Heparin is derived from animal mucosal tissues, almost exclusively from pigs. In China, numerous 
workshops harvest basic heparin material (heparin crude) by cooking and drying pig intestines collected 
from local slaughterhouses (figure 3). These workshops are often run by small farmers and are subject 
to limited regulatory scrutiny.47 Heparin crude is then sold, often through consolidators, to other plants 
that further refine the material into an active ingredient. In 2004, one such Chinese factory, Scientific 
Protein Laboratories–Changzhou (SPL-CZ),48,* became part of the heparin active-ingredient supply chain 
for Baxter International Inc.49 At the time, Baxter provided approximately 50 percent of the U.S. supply 
of heparin vial products.50,†
Figure 2
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Figure 3
Processing pig intestines to extract material used to create heparin crude.
Photo credit: Wall Street Journal. Used by permission.51
OSCS is a synthetic material that costs nearly 100 times less to produce than actual heparin.52 Because it 
mimics some of heparin’s chemical properties, it was not detected as an adulterant by standard assays53 
or by additional tests used by Baxter when the product reached the United States.54 
OSCS was identified in the finished heparin active ingredient made in China by SPL-CZ and in the crude 
material provided to SPL-CZ from consolidators.55 This evidence suggests that in the case of Baxter’s 
heparin, the OSCS was introduced upstream of SPL-CZ, possibly during crude heparin consolidation. 
Both Baxter and the FDA remain unable to pinpoint the exact source, or sources, of the adulteration.
Baxter was the major U.S. manufacturer of heparin, but other companies also executed heparin prod-
uct recalls. In the United States, 15 companies recalled at least 11 heparin drug and 72 medical device 
products (heparin is used to coat stents and in other medical devices).56 According to local health agen-
cies and news reports, products containing heparin were also recalled in 2008 in Australia, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland.57–60 Chinese authorities have acknowledged 
that heparin produced in China contained OSCS, although they question whether data have conclu-
sively linked the adulterant to the adverse allergic reactions.61 The FDA and others believe that persons 
in China added cheaper OSCS to crude heparin to cut costs.62,63 One industry insider estimates that to 
achieve this volume of distribution, from one to three tons of OSCS must have been produced and used 
to dilute real heparin, which would have generated $1 million to $3 million in profit for the individuals 
or companies that sold it.64    
Laboratory tests for many off-patent medications, including heparin, are established and updated by the 
U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention (USP), a nongovernmental standards-setting authority for prescription 
and over-the-counter (OTC) medicines manufactured or sold in the United States. Prior to the adultera-
tion, assays for heparin were based on a USP monograph from the 1950s, which had been infrequently 
updated,65 although it was in the process of being revised at the time of the incident. It seems likely that 
those who substituted OSCS for heparin crude used OSCS specifically because it would fool USP tests66 
by mimicking properties of heparin.67 The responsible parties may have learned of OSCS’s properties 
from published scientific papers that considered the material’s use as an anticoagulant.68 It is impossible 
to know whether they were aware that their actions would have adverse health outcomes. USP leader-
ship believes that European requirements for additional heparin tests likely helped limit the distribution 
of material in the European Union, but this was a complex situation that is still not entirely under-
stood.69 Other U.S.-based companies working with heparin also assert that their screening techniques 
would have detected the adulterant.70 Baxter reports that it performed tests in addition to those set 
out by USP, but that these, too, failed to detect OSCS.71 To avoid another tragedy, USP has updated its 
heparin monograph,72 and USP reports that it is working with European and Japanese pharmacopeias to 
harmonize standards.73
Apart from the assay failure, the heparin incident exposed a number of significant supply chain man-
agement problems on the part of the manufacturer and the FDA. Baxter began receiving heparin made 
at SPL-CZ in 2004, but did not conduct its own audit of that plant until 2007, relying instead on an 
earlier assessment by a different company.74 The FDA approved SPL-CZ as a supplier for Baxter without 
conducting a pre-approval inspection,75 in part because the agency confused SPL-CZ with another site 
in its database. When the FDA finally inspected SPL-CZ after the adverse events occurred, its inspectors 
found a number of manufacturing quality issues,76 including poor control of incoming raw materials.77 
When, in 2008, Baxter sent inspectors to retroactively evaluate its supply chain, they were denied access 
to upstream workshops and consolidators.78 The FDA was also denied access to two upstream consolida-
tors of heparin.79 In these cases, the agency did not take further action or issue import alerts (to prevent 
product from these sites from entering the United States) for these firms.80 However, the agency did 
place seven factories that produced heparin and were associated with OSCS contamination on import 
alert without physical examination of their facilities.81 SPL-CZ was classified within China as a chemical 
plant and therefore was not registered with the Chinese State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA).82 
The FDA has been unsuccessful in getting cooperation from Chinese authorities to investigate beyond 
the API maker.83 Ongoing investigations have revealed additional potential failures. In October 2010, an 
FDA inspection report of SPL’s Wisconsin facility alleges that the company learned of the possible pres-
ence of OSCS in two lots of heparin API in 2008, but did not investigate the issue for nearly a year.84 
Both lots were distributed, although it is not known if those products ever reached patients.85 
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The heparin tragedy may have been preceded by warning signs that could have suggested a heightened 
risk of economically motivated adulteration. The OSCS entered the supply chain at a time when a wide-
spread swine virus outbreak had greatly diminished Chinese pig herds.86 The price of pigs increased in 
2007,87 and the cost of pure heparin as well as heparin crude increased more than 100 percent between 
May and November 2007 (see figure 4). According to an expert in the pharmaceutical chemical industry, 
an alert purchasing department might have identified the price increase as a signal of potential risk  
to the product.88 A shortage of raw ingredient provides a motivation for deliberate substitutions of 
cheaper materials. 
Source: Beijing Orientbit Technology Co., Ltd.89
Baxter reports that it has instituted a number of initiatives to secure its supply chain against future adul-
teration. It is examining its global supply chain practices to identify vulnerabilities, reviewing relation-
ships with high-risk suppliers, reducing the number of suppliers, doing more concentrated audits and 
reviewing test methods.90 Baxter does not sell heparin vial products today, although it continues to sell 
other heparin products, none of which is produced using the supplier implicated in the recalls.91
 As FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg has noted, “In this day and age, companies must be able to 
effectively demonstrate that safety, quality and compliance with international and U.S. standards are 
built into every component of every product and every step of the production process.”92 Heparin’s 
complex supply chain was vulnerable to abuse by perpetrators that have not been identified and there-
fore never penalized, and Baxter failed to prevent a serious adulteration of its product. Chapter 1 reviews 
issues of outsourcing, globalization and supplier management.
1.1 Overview
The geography and complexity of drug manufacturing have changed dramatically during recent decades, 
presenting serious new challenges to oversight and increasing the risk that substandard drugs will reach 
patients. As drug manufacturing moves to foreign countries, and pharmaceutical ingredients are increas-
ingly purchased from overseas suppliers, ensuring manufacturing quality has become much more chal-
lenging for industry and regulators alike.
The FDA’s regulatory presence in foreign countries is lower than in the United States, and FDA inspec-
tors infrequently travel to developing countries such as India and China, where much of U.S. manufac-
turing has moved (see section 2.2.1).93–95 With less oversight, manufacturers may not rigorously observe 
quality measures, and in some cases individuals manage to deliberately substitute cheaper materials 
for high-quality ingredients (see section 1.3.2). While the vast majority of drugs in the United States is 
safe, these changes create significant risks of rare but potentially serious events by which U.S. patients 
are harmed by substandard or adulterated drugs. This chapter explores the trend toward globalized 
manufacturing and sourcing of ingredients, and the resulting challenges in industry supply chain quality 
control. 
1.2 Globalization of manufacturing
1.2.1 Movement of U.S. drug manufacturing overseas
The number of drug products made at non-U.S. sites doubled between 2001 and 2008, according to 
FDA estimates.96 An estimated 40 percent of finished drugs used in the United States are made abroad.97 
Non-U.S. manufacturing site registration with the FDA is growing rapidly, while domestic site registra-
tion has leveled off and begun to decline (see figure 5). Site registration in 2005 reached a milestone, 
according to the FDA’s estimates: for the first time, foreign sites registered with the FDA and subject to 
GMP inspections outnumbered those in the United States.
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In 2007, India and China together housed nearly 70 percent of the world’s active-drug-ingredient manu-
facturing sites, up from 49 percent in 2004.99 Seventy percent of pharmaceutical executives surveyed in 
2010 by the consulting firm Axendia reported having key suppliers in China, and 57 percent reported 
key suppliers in India, the top two countries so reported.100  
Global revenues for pharmaceutical contract manufacturing are on the rise, estimated at $22.4 billion in 
2009, with a projected value of $33.5 billion in 2014 for active ingredients, and for finished drugs $21.5 
billion in 2009, projected to increase to $39.6 billion in 2014 (see figures 6 and 7).101,* While the United 
States and the E.U. still represent large revenue shares for contract manufacturing, they increasingly face 
competition from low-cost manufacturers in India and China.102 Large U.S. companies have reported 
intent to outsource more manufacturing. At a 2007 meeting in Hong Kong, the head of global research 
and development for Pfizer said that the company was considering doubling outsourced manufacturing 
from 15 to 30 percent, with most of the work going to companies in Asia.103 That same year, the CEO of 
GlaxoSmithKline underscored the trend when he stated, “If we can buy it cheaper than we can make it, 
then of course that’s what we’re going to do.”104 In 2008, AstraZeneca’s CEO related a  plan to potentially 
outsource all active-ingredient manufacturing within the decade.105 
 
* FY 2011 incomplete
Source: FDA estimates based on data from the Field Accomplishments and Compliance Tracking System.98  Does not include medical gas 
establishments.
Emerging economies play increasingly larger roles in the U.S. drug supply. According to an analysis of 
import data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Foreign Trade Division, of the top 12 source countries for 
imported pharmaceuticals and medicines* by weight in 2009, four were emerging or developing econo-
mies: China, India, Brazil and Mexico.108 The United States imported more than 80 million kilograms of 
pharmaceuticals and medicines from China in 2009 (see figure 8), by far the largest amount from any 
country that year and representing more than 20 percent of all imported pharmaceuticals and medicines 
into the United States by weight.109 Pharmaceuticals and medicines from India were the third most im-
ported by weight in 2009, after Canada, and showed tremendous growth in this period—approximately 
30 million kilograms in 2009, compared with less than 5 million kilograms a decade earlier. Imports 
* Includes solid, semisolid, and both sterile and nonsterile liquid dosage forms.
U.S.          India          Europe          Rest of the World
Figure 6
Outsourced active-ingredient manufacturing revenue: growth by region
Figure 7
Outsourced finished drug manufacturing revenue: growth by region
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
$35 BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2007 2008 2009 2014
(projected)
2007 2008 2009 2014
(projected)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
$40 BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Source of original data: BCC Research.106
Source of original data: BCC Research.107
* The category of pharmaceuticals and medicines is so defined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). NAICS 3254: 
Pharmaceuticals and medicines may include substances for both human and veterinary use.
4000 ACTIVE SITES
3500
3500
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11*
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Foreign
Domestic
Figure 5
FDA-registered domestic and foreign establishments subject to GMP 
inspections, 2002-2011
PEW HEALTH GROUP24 aFter HeParIn: PROTECTInG COnSUMERS FROM THE RISkS OF SUBSTAnDARD AnD COUnTERFEIT DRUGS 25
—CHaPter 1— PHARmACEuTiCAL mANuFACTuRiNG: GLOBALiZATiON AND QuALiTy mANAGEmENT 
from Brazil grew in a similar fashion, mainly because of increased importation of lysine, a dietary sup-
plement. While pharmaceutical and medical imports from the eight developed nations* decreased as a 
proportion of total imports over this period (dropping from 57 to 43 percent), imports from China and 
India combined significantly increased their share (up from 11 to 29 percent).110
Focus: China
The United States is the number one destination for Chinese pharmaceutical raw material exports—a 
$2.2 billion business each year.111 In particular, China is a major source for older and off-patent phar-
maceutical ingredients in medicines sold in the United States.112,113,† U.S. Census Bureau data from 2009 
indicate that the United States imported large quantities of three major OTC pain relievers: ibuprofen, 
acetaminophen and aspirin (3 million, 3.5 million and 4 million kilograms, respectively).114 For all three 
products, the largest portion of imports came from China (see figure 9). China is also a major source 
of a number of older antibiotics. Ninety-four percent of imported tetracycline salts, an important class 
of antibiotics, originated in China from 2006 to 2008, as did three-quarters of imported streptomycin 
derivatives and salts used in injectable antibiotics and eye drops.115 
The Chinese bulk pharmaceutical market grows by about 20 percent in production value each year,116 
and China is home to thousands of domestic manufacturing facilities.117 The FDA has estimated that as 
many as 920 manufacturing plants in China may manufacture U.S. drugs and the ingredients used in 
them, and therefore may be subject to inspection by the FDA,118 an increase from 714 such sites  
in 2007.119
Focus: India
Indian pharmaceutical companies are actively pursuing U.S. market share.120,121 India was the third-larg-
est source of U.S.-imported pharmaceuticals and medicines by weight in 2009,122 and as of 2007, India 
produced about 20 percent of the world’s generic medicines.123,124 Indian plants are increasingly named 
in abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA), which companies file for approval to market generic 
pharmaceutical products. FDA estimates indicate that 40 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredient 
factories listed in U.S. generic drug applications in FY 2009 were based in India, while 10 percent were 
sites in the United States. This is a change from FY 1997, when Indian API plants represented just 6 per-
cent of those named in ANDAs.125 As of June 11, 2010, Indian companies had filed 2,234 drug master 
files (DMFs) with the FDA, more than 30 percent of all active drug product DMFs and the most filed by 
companies in any country, including the United States, according to an analysis by India’s Pharmaceuti-
cal Export Promotion Council.126 DMFs document the facilities, processes or articles used during drug 
manufacture and are normally a part of drug marketing applications. 
* Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, Ireland, Switzerland, Finland and Italy
† Many newer drug products aren’t individually identified in the specific data retrieved from the United States International Trade Commission, which lists 
commodities by 10-digit HTS code, and are therefore more difficult to track.
(Ranking based on 2009 data.)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division.127
Figure 9
Top source countries for U.S. imports of ibuprofen, acetaminophen and 
aspirin by weight (kg)in 2009
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1.2.2 Globalization of medical device manufacturing 
This report focuses on pharmaceuticals; however, medical devices and device components have related 
issues. Close to 5,000 non-U.S. manufacturing establishments for high- and medium-risk devices* were 
registered with the FDA as of 2007.129 Chinese plants were the majority, with 675 sites.130 A 2005 report 
by Millennium Research Group predicted that the global medical device outsourcing market would grow 
to $8 billion by 2009, largely because of outsourced component manufacturing.131 
Device recalls increased from 589 in 2005 to 616 in 2006, in part because of inadequate supplier  
controls, according to the former director of the Office of Compliance within the FDA’s Center for  
Devices and Radiological Health132 Forty-five FDA medical device warning letters went out in 2008 
because of insufficient or nonexistent supplier evaluations.133 As with pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
overseas device manufacturers are infrequently inspected. High-risk overseas device facilities are inspect-
ed every six years, and medium-risk facilities every 27 years, according to FDA estimates from 2008.134 
Although China is home to the largest number of FDA-registered device facilities outside the United 
States, the FDA inspects on average 10 Chinese device sites per year.135 To help increase the number 
of inspections, the Medical Device User Fee Modernization Act of 2002 required the FDA to institute 
third-party inspection programs conducted by trained and authorized entities. Two such programs were 
launched in 2004 and 2006, respectively, but as of June 2009, only 21 third-party inspections had  
been conducted.136 
1.3 Gaps in ensuring quality and safety 
overseas 
1.3.1 Manufacturing quality and regulation in India and China
Countries such as India and China, today’s major players in drug manufacturing, have different regula-
tory and industry landscapes than the United States. Both countries have taken steps to strengthen 
oversight of pharmaceutical manufacturing and modernize GMP regimes. However, adherence to manu-
facturing quality standards—a critical means of safeguarding product quality and safety (see sidebar 
2)—has been difficult and costly for many plants in both India and China. Also, measurements of drug 
quality have indicated that substandard and counterfeit products have been an issue in the domestic 
market in these countries. An expert committee organized by the government of India reported that the 
prevalence of substandard drugs in various Indian states ranged from 8.19 to 10.64 percent (based on 
data from 1995 to 2003),137 and a survey of medicine quality by China’s State Food and Drug Adminis-
tration in the final quarter of 1998 found 13.1 percent of 20,000 batches tested to be substandard  
or counterfeit.138 
* Devices are generally divided into three classes: I, II and III. The classification is risk based: Class I includes devices bearing the lowest risk to patients, and 
Class III includes devices bearing the greatest risk; see www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm.
There are wide variations in production and quality capability among plants producing pharmaceutical 
products in both India and China.139–141 When GMP standards in China were made mandatory in 2004, 
up to one-third of Chinese factories were unable to meet the regulations, according to one estimate.142 
In February 2011, China announced updated GMP requirements that incorporate concepts such as 
quality risk management and supplier audits.143 Industry analysts predict that implementation of these 
new standards over the next five years will result in the closure of small firms that lack the resources to 
comply.144 Plants that do not meet regulations are not lawfully allowed to sell their products for pharma-
ceutical use; however, experts with direct knowledge of the Chinese industry indicate that some of these 
companies’ materials may still be purchased by pharmaceutical producers.145,146
India announced a modernization of its GMPs in 2001.147 As in China, implementation of the revised 
GMPs posed a challenge, because many smaller pharmaceutical companies did not have the resources to 
meet the new standards.148 In 2008, India’s National Productivity Council found that 40 percent of small 
pharmaceutical industries had closed down because of their inability to comply with revised GMPs.149 
In 2008 and 2010, respectively, two large Indian manufacturers, Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited and 
Claris Lifesciences Limited, were placed on import alert by the FDA,150,151 meaning they were prevented 
from exporting certain products to the U.S. market. In both cases, GMP failures observed by the FDA 
prompted this regulatory action.152,153
Despite improved GMP standards in both China and India, enforcement concerns remain. At present, 
the FDA cannot conduct sufficiently frequent oversight visits to foreign sites that make drugs and ingre-
dients for use in U.S. drugs (see section 2.1). But oversight regimes in India and China may not be suf-
ficient to remedy this gap. An expert council convened by the Indian government in 2003 reported that 
there were serious inadequacies in India’s regulatory system, including unsatisfactory levels of enforce-
ment at the state level, shortages of trained personnel and inadequate testing facilities.154 Pharmaceuti-
cals exported from China receive lower scrutiny as a category.155 Although China requires that exported 
medical products meet the regulatory standards of the destination country, it places full responsibility 
with the receiving party for ensuring that products meet those quality standards. China and the United 
States are working towards a system to ensure that certain products designated for export receive addi-
tional scrutiny from the Chinese authorities.156
Adherence to GMPs is critical, yet also costly. Compliance with internal quality systems and regula-
tions can represent up to 25 percent of a finished drug manufacturer’s operating costs.157 To offer more 
competitive pricing and gain market share, some plants may be tempted to forgo expensive quality 
standards. Regulatory oversight provides an incentive to ensure rigorous adherence to standards. Plants 
making generic and OTC medicines and ingredients may be particularly sensitive to the costs of compli-
ance. In the United States, prices for generic drugs drop as more players enter the market.158 Growing 
numbers of Indian and Chinese manufacturers making off-patent products and ingredients have made 
this sector increasingly competitive.159–161 As prices fall, companies may seek new efficiencies. India’s 
emergence as a major exporter of generics was due in part to its ability to produce drug products much 
more cheaply than its competitors.162
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CaSe Study 2
wHIStle-Blower alert: ranBaxy laBoratorIeS lIMIted
In 2008, the FDA suspended importation of more than 30 products from Indian generics company 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited after discovering manufacturing quality and safety violations.163 
Ranbaxy is one of the largest worldwide producers of finished-product generic medicines, as well 
as of generic active ingredients. Its products filled 52 million U.S. prescriptions in 2007.164 The FDA 
conducted an in-depth inspection of two Ranbaxy plants in 2008 that revealed numerous alleged 
safety and quality issues affecting drugs destined for U.S. patients as well as drugs made for U.S.-
sponsored aid programs.165 Ranbaxy allegedly submitted false testing data to the FDA,166 improper-
ly conducted stability studies167 and submitted records to the FDA signed by employees who were 
not present at the facility at the dates or times of their purported signature.168 In addition to testing 
and documentation violations, the FDA warning letters also claim Ranbaxy exposed products to 
potential cross-contamination with penicillin,169 had inadequate sterility procedures and failed to 
adequately investigate sterility failures.170 According to a Department of Justice subpoena motion, 
Ranbaxy also used active ingredients made at sites not approved by the FDA, sometimes blending 
this material with active ingredient from approved plants, and delayed notifying the agency about 
drugs that did not meet established specifications.171
After notification of potential problems in 2005, the FDA began an investigation, inspecting two 
Ranbaxy plants in 2006.172 The FDA found significant GMP violations during these inspections and 
issued a warning letter to Ranbaxy regarding its Paonta Sahib facility in June 2006.173 The FDA then 
met with Ranbaxy several times but did not take further disciplinary action.174 In 2008, the agency 
returned to inspect the Ranbaxy plants and again found significant GMP violations in both loca-
tions.175 The FDA subsequently blocked importation of more than 30 pharmaceuticals from the 
Ranbaxy plants located in Paonta Sahib and Dewas,176 including drugs for epilepsy, diabetes and 
allergies.177 Drugs from other Ranbaxy plants were not blocked. In 2009, citing ongoing violations, 
the FDA invoked its application integrity policy and halted reviews of all generic drug applications 
listing the Paonta Sahib plant as a manufacturing site.178 In late 2009, the FDA issued another  
warning letter citing GMP violations, this time to a Ranbaxy facility called Ohm Laboratories in  
new York State.179
While Ranbaxy violations were ultimately met with a strong regulatory response, this case calls 
attention to several weaknesses in existing regulations. The investigations were precipitated by 
information given to the FDA by a whistle-blower working at Ranbaxy rather than by a routine FDA 
inspection.180,181 Clearly, individuals within industry who wish to bring information to the attention 
of the FDA and other regulatory bodies need to be protected. Moreover, the agency currently 
lacks the general authority to subpoena witnesses and documents for violations of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and may not be able to thoroughly investigate safety issues without 
outside help such as from the U.S. Department of Justice, which subpoenaed internal company 
documents in the Ranbaxy case (see section 2.4.1). Increasing the FDA’s on-the-ground presence in 
countries such as India could strengthen its oversight of imported drug products and help it identify 
issues more readily, according to U.S. Pharmacopeia experts and FDA staff.182,183
Ranbaxy is not the only large Indian company to be placed on import alert by the FDA. In June 
2010, an intravenous antibiotic product manufactured by Claris Lifesciences Limited, in India, was 
discovered to be nonsterile (which can cause infections) and to contain floating white particles, 
identified in at least one case as mold.184 Three intravenous antibiotic products were then recalled 
by Claris and by three companies that sold the drugs in the United States under their labels through 
licensing agreements: Pfizer Inc., Sagent Pharmaceuticals and West-Ward Pharmaceuticals.185,186 
In november 2010, the FDA placed Claris Lifesciences under import alert, preventing its products 
from entering the United States.187
1.3.2 Drug ingredient quality issues resulting from deceptive practices 
In emerging economies, highly competitive markets and lower regulatory enforcement may combine 
to encourage deliberate circumvention of costly quality regulations and certifications. Such deceptions 
have affected the U.S. drug supply (see case studies 1, 3, 4). The FDA has uncovered falsification of 
data several times in recent years. In a January 2010 warning letter, the FDA claimed that employees at 
XiAn Libang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., in Shaanxi Province, China, were manipulating testing data.188 
The agency informed the API manufacturing plant that it would not consider new marketing applica-
tions until the observed violations were sufficiently addressed.189 In February 2010, Indian manufac-
turer Glochem was found to have falsified batch-manufacturing records for clopidogrel, an antiplatelet 
medicine. E.U. inspectors discovered at least 70 batch-manufacturing records in the plant’s waste yard. 
All of the records had been re-written, and in some cases original entries had been changed.190 And as 
discussed, in 2008, the FDA cited Indian manufacturer Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited for a number of 
U.S. GMP violations, including alleged falsification of stability testing records.191
Noncompliant drug-ingredient manufacturers may hide uncertified materials or production sites by 
physically concealing these factory rooms or warehouses (see figure 10) or through misrepresentations  
in documentation and packaging. One auditor in China suggested that some manufacturers claim 
regulatory certifications they do not possess.192 Such deceptions may permit unqualified manufacturers 
to gain business inappropriately, and may mislead regulators and industry efforts to assess quality and 
safety standards.
Another documented misrepresentation is the relabeling of materials produced at unknown or unap-
proved sites (see case studies 3 and 4). Such falsification poses risks to patients because neither the 
purchaser nor regulators can ensure a product’s quality without knowing the conditions of its manufac-
ture (which is why the FDA requires manufacturing sites to be listed in a drug’s marketing application). 
While testing may ultimately show some improperly sourced materials to be safe, their untracked and 
unvalidated origins could conceal substandard material or poor production. 
Economic motivation often drives these behaviors. Drug-ingredient suppliers may bring in additional 
material from unreported sources to meet growing product demand, as was the case for Biochimica 
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GentaMICIn and FlavIne InternatIonal:  
FalSe laBelInG ConCealS unaPProved  
ManuFaCturInG PlantS
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Flavine International Inc., a broker selling API to U.S. manufac-
turers, bought low-cost materials from plants in China that were not approved by the FDA and 
relabeled them as if they were active ingredients from the Long March Pharmaceutical Plant, an 
FDA-approved facility.202 Flavine sold the falsely labeled APIs, which included bulk shipments of 
the antibiotic gentamicin to U.S. manufacturers.203  A few years later, these manufacturers recalled 
gentamicin products from the market.204 
Flavine’s labeling deception came to light because the broker was importing more product than 
Long March’s facilities were physically able to produce, leading the FDA to suspect that some of the 
API came from other unspecified sources.205  In 1994, Long March officials confirmed that materi-
als sold by Flavine had not been made at Long March, even though they were labeled as such.206  
In 1997, Flavine International, Inc., was fined, and its owner sentenced to two years in prison.207  A 
Congressional review of the FDA’s Flavine investigation showed that, although the FDA received 
reports of 1,974 adverse reactions (including 49 deaths) in patients taking gentamicin between 1989 
and 1994, the agency’s final report did not document any steps taken to alert the two companies 
that purchased the falsified product from Flavine or to track down suspect material that might 
remain on the market.208 
In 1998, a year after Flavine was fined, the CDC identified 20 adverse patient reactions in California 
related to gentamicin made by Fujisawa USA (one of the manufacturers purchasing gentamicin from 
Flavine), including chills, shaking and drops in blood pressure. Thirty-seven similar events were iden-
tified in seven other states.209  The CDC report stated that the reactions were probably due to the 
method of administration, combined with high levels of endotoxin (a toxin produced by bacteria) in 
Fujisawa’s product.210
Although the FDA had suspicions about gentamicin packaged under the Long March Pharmaceuti-
cal label since the early 1990s, the agency did not recommend detaining gentamicin shipments 
from the plant until 1999, after an inspection found good manufacturing practice violations at  
the site.211
This case and more recent investigations212,* underscore the importance of purchasing companies 
scrutinizing their suppliers to verify that all production is actually occurring at the declared sites, and 
that sufficient quality systems are in place.
Opos, a company making antibiotics for the U.S. market (see case study 4). Pharmaceutical ingredi-
ents made at uncertified plants may be offered at attractively low prices if the factory is not committing 
operating expenses to complying with costly quality standards. Economic incentives may also encourage 
the introduction of substitute materials specifically designed to thwart standard tests. The adulterant 
found in heparin (see case study 1) was almost certainly chosen because it was a cheap substitute for the 
genuine product that mimicked the real drug in U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP) assays.193,194
In some cases, companies may remain unaware for years of supplier deception. One Chinese supplier 
to U.S. manufacturer International Medication Systems, Limited (IMS) claimed to be a manufacturer of 
heparin but in reality was not. This “show” factory, Shanghai No. 1, was registered with the FDA as an 
exporter of heparin active ingredient to the United States and had an authorized U.S. agent, Amphastar 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., which in 2004 declared to the FDA that heparin was produced at Shanghai No. 1 
under GMP conditions.195 The FDA claims that Shanghai No. 1 had in fact been shipping heparin made 
at two external plants to the United States since 2001.196 IMS had been importing this falsely labeled 
heparin as early as 2001 according to the FDA, but the fraudulent activity was only discovered seven 
years later. Further, the FDA alleges that some heparin shipped to the United States by Shanghai No. 
1 in 2008 (but made elsewhere) may have contained the same heparin adulterant associated with U.S. 
patient adverse events.197,198,*
APIs are at particular risk of falsification. One pharmaceutical auditor working in China observed during 
inspections and audits that for 39 percent of exported APIs, the final European or American customer 
was misinformed about the identity of the manufacturing site where all or part of the manufacturing 
took place.199 He occasionally sees uncertified API concealed in hidden factory rooms or warehouses (see 
figure 10).200 Pharmaceutical brokers and traders have also been responsible for concealing the source of 
drug products, and failing to adequately verify the products they buy and sell. For instance, diethylene 
glycol (an industrial solvent) has been labeled as glycerin (a common inactive ingredient for cold and 
cough syrups) and sold into distribution numerous times, causing hundreds of deaths (see case study 5).
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Figure 10
European inspectors in Zhejiang, China, found empty drums 
blocking access to part of a certified API plant exporting to 
Europe and the United States. Further investigation revealed 
a vast warehouse of substandard or falsely certified APIs.
Image courtesy of Philippe André, Associate Professor at the School 
of Pharmaceutical Science and Technology at Tianjin University, 
China (2008).201
* A recent examination of the impurity profiles of 39 samples of bulk gentamicin from the German and U.S. markets found drug substances listed from 
individual producers with different impurity profiles, suggesting that these producers may have brought in material from other undisclosed sources.
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CaSe Study 5
letHal CouGH SyruP In PanaMa
In Panama in 2006, cough medicine that had been manufactured using a toxic syrup originating in 
China was unknowingly distributed by the government.228 The official number of deaths was 78,229 
but unofficial reports suggest the possibility of a much larger toll.230
The Taixing Glycerin Factory in Hengxiang, China labeled barrels of diethylene glycol (DEG), an 
industrial solvent often used in antifreeze formulations, as glycerin, a common excipient (inactive 
ingredient) used to make medicines into syrups.231,232 DEG is chemically similar to glycerin, but it is 
less expensive to make.233 The material passed through brokers in China and Spain, being relabeled 
at each step, before finally reaching Panama.234,235 In 2006, the Panamanian government purchased 
the material and used it to manufacture an estimated 60,000 units of medicines, which were distrib-
uted to patients.236
When patients began to suffer paralysis and die, medical personnel could not determine the cause 
until more than a month after the adulterated medicine was distributed. Even when the substitution 
of DEG for glycerin was discovered, relabeling by brokers prevented officials from quickly identify-
ing the source. Each time the fake glycerin changed hands, an international broker created new 
certificates of analysis indicating identity and purity, presumably without independently testing the 
product. Obfuscation of records impairs investigations of this sort of deception and shields bad ac-
tors from identification and prosecution. As of early 2011, no one in China has been held account-
able for the deaths in Panama.
This was not the first DEG poisoning. Indeed, the use of DEG to manufacture Elixir Sulfanilamide (a 
liquid antibiotic) in the United States in 1937 caused more than 100 deaths and led directly to the 
enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.237 Between 1937 and 2008, there were 
more than 750 documented deaths in 10 countries associated with exposure to drugs contaminated 
with DEG.238 The largest loss involved the deaths of 236 children in Bangladesh between 1990 and 
1992.239 According to an investigation by the New York Times, 50 tons of fake glycerin shipped to 
the United States in 1995 were fortunately identified.240 But in 1997, at least 88 children in Haiti 
were reportedly killed by this adulterant,241 which was also traced back to a Chinese manufacturer 
and involved one or more brokers.242 In 1998, DEG poisoning was implicated in the deaths of 33 
children in Guragon, India.243 After the disaster in Panama, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
issued guidance that all glycerin used in drug manufacturing, including glycerin imported into the 
United States, be tested for DEG.244  The U.S. Pharmacopeia released a more stringent monograph 
for glycerin with revised testing methods in 2009.245
CaSe Study 4
BIoCHIMICa oPoS: antIBIotIC InGredIentS SourCed 
FroM undISCloSed SuPPlIerS
In the mid- to late 1990s, an Italian pharmaceutical manufacturer making bulk antibiotics for the U.S. 
market deliberately falsified records to conceal from the FDA its use of undisclosed manufacturing 
sites.213,214 The manufacturer, Biochimica Opos (Opos), was at the time a wholly owned subsidiary of 
French drug company Roussel-Uclaf.215
The FDA visited Opos’ factory in Agrate Brianza, Italy, in May 1996 for a post-approval inspection 
and became concerned by apparent inconsistencies in information given to them by employees 
at the plant, including records documenting where the materials used to make one antibiotic—
cefaclor—had been manufactured.216 In October 1996, Roussel-Uclaf admitted it had not produced 
cefaclor in accordance with its approved marketing application, and also admitted to similar infrac-
tions for antibiotics clindamycin and minocycline for the U.S. market. The company recalled the 
three products and withdrew its approved marketing applications.217
The case was referred to the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations in 1997218 and culminated in 
multiple felony charges, including conspiracy and distribution of adulterated drugs in interstate 
commerce with intent to defraud or mislead.219 On October 19, 2001, five years after the FDA’s 
initial inspection, Roussel-Uclaf’s successor, Aventis Pharma A.G., pleaded guilty to these charges 
and was ordered to pay a $23,193,600 criminal fine and forfeit $10 million in proceeds to the  
U.S. government.220
Roussel-Uclaf had falsified batch production records, raw material logs and work orders to cre-
ate the appearance that all of its manufacturing occurred at sites designated in its approved U.S. 
marketing application.221 In reality, the company was outsourcing the manufacture of materials used 
to make cefaclor to facilities in Italy, France and Romania that were not listed in its application or 
inspected by the FDA.222 This put Opos in knowing breach of its approved manufacturing pathway. 
Further, Opos was found to have used a different, unapproved chemical in place of a required 
chemical for cefaclor processing.223 
The Opos case represented the first time a foreign corporation making a drug product entirely out-
side of the United States received a criminal punishment for defrauding the FDA.224 One FDA agent 
reported that the investigation was made difficult by its foreign nature; in particular, some potential 
witnesses were not subject to U.S. subpoena.225 However, U.S. investigators did receive assistance 
from foreign authorities in accessing important documents and witnesses.226 To support this type of 
cooperation, the FDA should be allowed to share all information, including trade secret information, 
in a protected manner with foreign agencies—a general authority that it does not currently have 
(see section 2.4.3).227 As drug manufacturing becomes increasingly globalized, international collabo-
ration is essential for improving oversight and identifying wrongdoing.
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at least 78 people in Panama died259 after taking cough medicine manufactured using a toxic ingredient 
that carried a falsified COA.260 Each broker that handled the syrup replicated the previous COA, pre-
sumably without independently testing the material.261 
Two factors make thorough evaluation of suppliers prior to contracting important. (1) Once a supplier 
relationship is established, the costs and risk of interrupted supply make breaking or altering that rela-
tionship difficult, especially if few alternatives are available. (2) In many cases, companies must obtain 
prior approval from the FDA in order to change suppliers262,263—a regulatory hurdle that may further 
disincentivize terminating relationships. 
The purity of raw ingredients and the safety of production methods are critical to the quality of a drug. 
Nonetheless, suppliers and brokers do not always allow FDA officials, or even the manufacturer of the 
finished product, to access plants at which key processes are performed. After the heparin contamina-
tion, for example, Baxter International could not gain access to Chinese raw material processing sites264 
(see case study 1).  And in December 2010, the FDA was denied access to an active-ingredient manufac-
turing facility in India.265
To address concerns about supply chain quality control, a number of companies have taken a private-
sector collaborative approach to information sharing and leveraging one another’s supplier audit results. 
Rx-360, an industry consortium, has created such a shared audit program and also disseminates infor-
mation on risk signals to its members.266 The Federal Trade Commission has indicated that these activi-
ties do not constitute anticompetitive activity.267
Unlike most products, labels on drugs may not offer consumers a clear picture of the countries from 
which these medicines have come. U.S. statute requires all imported products to display their country 
of origin to the ultimate purchaser,268 defined as the last person to receive the product in the form it was 
imported.269 Imported finished drugs, therefore, must list the country where manufacturing occurred. 
But if a company imports a pharmaceutical active ingredient and then formulates that substance into a 
pill or liquid medicine in the United States, the form of that product has changed, and country-of-origin 
labeling requirements thus cease to apply. Although separate drug packaging regulations require some 
identification of origin of the finished drug product, companies may choose whether to display the name 
and address of the manufacturer, the packer or the distributor.270 If the manufacturer is named, it is the 
manufacturer of the finished drug product, and not the manufacturer of the active ingredient.
1.4 Problems with domestic controls on 
supply chain and quality
1.4.1 Insufficiencies in supplier management
Outsourcing allows pharmaceutical companies to cut costs and reduce manufacturing time,246 but can 
also result in diminished control and transparency, particularly when contractors and suppliers are in 
distant geographic locations. According to a 2010 survey by the Axendia consulting firm, 94 percent  
of pharmaceutical executives think that raw material sourcing from foreign suppliers is a serious or 
moderate risk.247,*
Members of industry and FDA experts recognize the need for strong contractor and supplier manage-
ment.248–250 Ensuring that suppliers adhere to current good manufacturing practice (cGMP) standards† is 
a critical means of safeguarding product quality and safety (see sidebar 2). FDA guidance recommends 
that companies verify that a potential contractor is qualified before engagement and audit their suppliers 
in addition to testing incoming components.251 However, these recommendations are not requirements, 
and FDA officials have expressed concerns about industry supply chain vulnerabilities, including insuf-
ficient knowledge of contract manufacturing sites, too little on-site auditing of suppliers and overreliance 
on supplier-provided documentation of testing.252—254 In a 2009 presentation, an FDA Office of Com-
pliance official noted that industry supplier qualification programs, quality agreements and life cycle 
monitoring were often deficient.255 A surge in FDA warning letters to both foreign and domestic contract 
manufacturers illustrates the agency’s concerns: the FDA sent 15 warning letters to contractors in the 
first half of 2010, up from just two for all of 2007.256 An FDA official noted that these increases specific 
to contractor problems probably were not attributable to changes in FDA activity, as the agency had not 
stepped up oversight of contract manufacturers as a category.257
While FDA guidance addresses supplier qualification and auditing, the FDA regulations do not. Current 
GMPs require manufacturers to control the quality of incoming drug components through testing. How-
ever, they do not explicitly require manufacturers to evaluate component suppliers prior to contracting 
with them, nor to engage in quality agreements with those suppliers, nor to conduct on-site audits of 
suppliers’ plants (see sidebar 2). As long as manufacturers verify ingredient batches with an identity test 
(and conduct additional testing periodically to validate a supplier’s results), U.S. cGMP allows them to 
rely on supplier-provided certificates of analysis (COA), which assert that the ingredient meets purity, 
strength and quality specifications.258 COAs may be of limited utility in assessing the actual quality stan-
dards and practices in place at a supplier’s plant. COAs may even come from a broker that sells a drug 
ingredient rather than from the original ingredient manufacturer. In 2007, as described in case study 5, 
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1.4.2 Manufacturing quality issues in the United States
Drug-quality problems are not restricted to emerging economies or to areas where oversight is weak. 
The FDA has observed quality failures at domestic manufacturers in recent years, and the United States 
has also experienced an upward trend in drug product recalls. The number of product recalls has con-
sistently risen since 2005, with a sharp increase in 2009 (see figure 11). Drug product recalls in 2009 
represented a fourfold increase over recalls in 2008 (1,742 and 426, respectively).285,* Of the 2009 
recalls, 1,384 (nearly 80 percent) were for problems with manufacturing or testing methods.286 This 
increase in recalls may not reflect an increase in manufacturing quality problems, as multiple products 
may be impacted by GMP violations at one plant. However, manufacturing issues have become a much 
more prominent concern in the FDA’s warning letters to industry, with 34 cGMP warning letters sent to 
drug companies in 2009, approximately double the total in 2008 (see figure 12).287 The recent events 
described below have, in many cases, been discovered because of FDA plant inspections, which occur 
much more frequently in the United States than overseas (see section 2.1). 
■   In 2010, Johnson & Johnson recalled more than 130 million bottles of children’s cough and cold 
medicines288 after an FDA inspection revealed 20 alleged cGMP violations, including failure to 
conduct an adequate investigation of inactive ingredients that were contaminated with bacteria.289
■   In April 2010, the FDA warned the Michigan-based L. Perrigo Co., which also manufactures 
OTC cough and cold medications, for multiple cGMP violations,290 including the discovery 
ibuprofen tablets contaminated with metal shavings.291 The FDA has reported cGMP and compli-
ance issues at Perrigo since 2005.292 In 2006, that company recalled 384 lots of acetaminophen 
tablets after the discovery of metal particles in some of the drugs.293 
■   In October 2010, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) agreed to pay $750 million in a civil plea agreement 
for distributing adulterated drugs that did not meet necessary levels of strength, purity or quality. 
The United States contends that some of the drugs contained the wrong amount of active ingre-
dient, and some were possibly exposed to contamination by microorganisms.294,† 
■   In May 2010, Genzyme Corp. signed a consent decree with the FDA and agreed to pay $175 
million after the agency discovered serious manufacturing quality issues at the company’s All-
ston, Mass., plant. Alleged violations included drug contamination with metal, glass and rub-
ber particles, and viral contamination in manufacturing equipment. The consent decree holds 
Genzyme to a strict schedule of improvements to bring its plant in line with FDA regulations.295 
SIdeBar 2
enSurInG QualIty: Good ManuFaCturInG PraCtICeS 
The FDA and its counterpart agencies worldwide monitor the quality and safety of drug and device 
manufacturing by inspecting plants and validating compliance with cGMPs, which are regulations 
that describe the methods, equipment, facilities and controls required for producing safe products. 
Because it is impossible to test every single pharmaceutical item produced, adherence to manufac-
turing quality standards is the most effective way that the FDA and industry can ensure drug quality 
and safety. While noncompliance with manufacturing quality standards does not necessarily mean 
that a drug is unsafe, it increases that risk by weakening the safeguards. 
Both finished drugs and their components (ingredients) must be made under cGMP: although 
cGMP standards themselves address finished drugs and not drug components, the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act considers any drug, including its ingredients, not made under cGMPs to 
be adulterated.271 Contract manufacturer plants are also subject to the FDA inspections,272 although 
ultimate responsibility in the eyes of the FDA rests with the manufacturer marketing the product in 
the United States.273 The FDA announced in April 2010 that it intends to revise cGMPs related to 
incoming components.274
Manufacturing quality standards for drugs are set by the FDA,275 by other regulatory authorities and 
also cooperatively in guidance through the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). The ICH brings together the 
regulatory authorities of Europe, Japan and the United States (and experts from the pharmaceuti-
cal industry in the three regions) to discuss scientific and technical aspects of product registration. 
The ICH quality guidelines (Q1–Q10) have been largely accepted by the FDA and published in the 
Federal Register. The World Health Organization has also developed a number of guidelines on 
quality assurance, including pharmaceutical GMP.276 The FDA guidance describes ways that industry 
can comply with cGMP requirements, but these recommendations are nonbinding. The FDA can 
only enforce actual regulatory requirements and not recommendations in guidance.
The FDA has found that since the last substantive update to its cGMP regulations in 1978, there 
have been many advances in manufacturing quality systems and science.277 The agency promul-
gated guidance for industry in 2006 on a quality systems approach to cGMP regulations, which in-
cludes risk assessment, management responsibility and greater assessment of component suppliers. 
The FDA is also looking to update its GMP regulations to require manufacturers to audit component 
suppliers, including providers of raw materials.278,279 A quality systems approach is already in place in 
the United States for medical devices, known as Quality Systems Regulation (QSR),280 and has been 
embraced in international guidance such as the ICH Q10 Pharmaceutical Quality System.281 Provi-
sions covering supplier evaluation are found in both device QSR (“purchasing controls”)282 and ICH 
guidance (“materials management”).283,284
Guidance is an important tool to encourage companies to advance quality systems voluntarily, but 
these systems are not currently required through regulation or in the statute. As discussed above, 
important elements such as robust supplier qualification may not be uniformly adopted by industry 
(see section 1.4.1).
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This was the first settlement of a case brought under the False Claims Act regarding pharmaceutical manufacturing quality.
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1.4.3 Challenges involved in testing
Pharmaceutical manufacturers must perform tests to ensure the identity, strength and purity of their 
drug products.298 Under cGMPs established by the FDA, testing must be performed on incoming drug 
components and in-process materials as well as finished drugs.299 Companies seeking to market a drug 
in the United States must specify the analytical methods necessary to ensure that drugs and their com-
ponents meet established levels of quality in their applications to the FDA.300 Specifications may also be 
published publicly as a drug monograph in the U.S. Pharmacopeia and National Formulary (USP-NF).301 
The FDA can ensure that a drug meets established specifications by enforcing adherence to: applicable 
public monographs,302 the terms of approved drug applications303 or GMP requirements.304 Failure to 
follow appropriate testing procedures has been implicated in a number of high-profile quality problems 
in 2009 and 2010.305–307
An important function of testing is to screen for possibly harmful contaminants. But according to USP 
leadership, many existing tests are out of date,308 including, at the time of the adulteration, USP’s stan-
dard identity test for heparin (although revisions were in process).309 USP officials believe that an up-to-
date heparin monograph might have prevented the adulterated product from reaching the U.S. market, 
and that Europe’s more robust test specifications for heparin may have helped limit distribution of the 
adulterated drug there.310
USP estimates that as of June 2009, 44 percent of human drugs (both on- and off-patent) in the United 
States either had no public monograph, or a monograph that was out of date.311 Many on-patent prod-
ucts do not have public monographs because of industry trade secret concerns; however, USP reports 
that 16 percent of off-patent drugs also do not have USP-NF monographs.312
Part of the challenge of updating testing specifications to anticipate intentional adulteration is predicting 
what the contaminants will be. Impurities measured by standard tests are normally process-related and 
thus simpler to anticipate. They can be by-products of chemical processes or residual materials such as 
metals or salts that may be introduced during manufacturing.313 (The FDA recommends, in accordance 
with ICH guidelines, that companies identify and list impurities in their drug specifications.)314 
While designing a test to capture any unexpected substance in a drug is essentially impossible, bet-
ter methodologies for predicting non-process-related adulterants are needed, according to academics 
regulators and members of industry.315–317 The FDA has emphasized the need to identify products at 
highest risk for economically motivated adulteration,318 and has risk-ranked 1,000 APIs as of October 
2010.319 An expert at the National Institute for Pharmaceutical Technology and Education, an organiza-
tion focused on increasing science-based understanding of pharmaceutical product development and 
manufacturing, further suggests that advances in manufacturing science are overdue in the pharmaceuti-
cal sector and are needed to ensure product quality.320 Leadership at the FDA’s Office of Pharmaceutical 
Science also assert that pharmaceutical science is not state of the art compared to other industries and is 
characterized by inefficiencies, inability to analyze failures and waste.321
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Roundtable participants fully agreed that safety risks exist in our globalized pharmaceutical supply 
chain, and that the system can and must be improved. Participants called for improvements in quality 
systems, subcontractor agreements, supplier audits, supply chain documentation and transparency, as 
well as testing. Many present underscored the fact that you cannot inspect quality into a product; it  
must be built in to every process. One participant suggested the pharmaceutical industry still relies  
on “quality by inspection,” and made a comparison to other regulated industries that have embraced  
a “quality by design” concept. These industries have very rigid control over raw materials and low  
product defect rates.
Stakeholders supported strong supplier assessment and management. FDA representatives called for in-
dustry implementation of quality systems to identify and mitigate hazards, and ensure sufficient scrutiny 
of suppliers and contractors. There was strong agreement that manufacturers must be held account-
able for their full supply chain and that they need to have concrete knowledge of suppliers when they 
are selected, rather than after they have become part of the supply chain. Before doing business with 
a supplier, drug license holders should be sure that a supplier has good quality systems in place. One 
industry representative recommended that every supplier and sub-supplier within a manufacturing sup-
ply chain should be audited by someone. Another important action for manufacturers to take, according 
to the FDA and other participants, is to insist that their pharmaceutical ingredient suppliers in China 
are licensed pharmaceutical manufacturers rather than chemical companies, which receive no Chinese 
government oversight. 
Several commenters focused on the importance of information sharing between companies and through 
groups such as Rx-360, as well as clear communication between companies and suppliers. A representa-
tive of Rx-360 suggested that quality agreements should define GMP expectations, list approved raw 
materials and provide clarification on which companies are authorized subcontractors. A representative 
of European fine chemical manufacturers noted that companies should be on alert for clues that indicate 
increased risk of tampering (such as the doubling of the heparin price discussed above). Additional 
recommendations included expanding enforcement of cGMP regulations to include excipients. 
Several participants called for greater transparency throughout the supply chain. Consumer representa-
tives called for public engagement so that the public understands where medications come from, with 
the caveat that those messages be balanced so that consumers do not stop taking their medications. 
Active-ingredient manufacturers and others supported companies listing publicly the country of origin 
of their drugs and active ingredients. Regarding testing, USP leadership encouraged greater collaboration 
with the FDA to update USP public monographs to include the most relevant, up-to-date testing  
standards. 
The policy recommendations that follow have been informed by the roundtable discussions and presen-
tations, but are not intended to constitute a consensus position and may not reflect the views of every 
participating organization.
For drug specifications that are not publicly shared, the responsibility of developing robust testing sys-
tems lies with the manufacturer, and all companies must take steps to predict and respond to the risk of 
adulteration. For public standards, USP asserts that remedying its backlog of outdated drug monographs 
will require better participation from industry and the FDA.322 The agency is working with USP to revise 
outdated USP-NF monographs.323 Because of their public nature, consideration should also be given to 
using multiple tests to make a standard harder to fool. The FDA and USP revised the monograph for 
heparin in 2008 to include new tests,324 and that monograph continues to be revised in collaboration 
with the international community.325
Testing alone is not sufficient to ensure product safety, but it is a critical element of an effective  
quality system.326
1.5 Pew conference and policy 
recommendations
Many of the active ingredients in the drugs that U.S. consumers take are made abroad, but there is insuf-
ficient oversight by the FDA and foreign authorities of materials made overseas for use in U.S. drugs. 
With extensive outsourcing and increased reliance on foreign suppliers, manufacturers may have less 
knowledge and control over production supply chains. These weaknesses are especially alarming in light 
of the risk of deliberate ingredient adulteration for profit. 
To ensure the safety of the globalized pharmaceutical industry, companies must ensure greater control 
of manufacturing quality, both internally and with their suppliers. Companies sourcing pharmaceutical 
active ingredients and intermediates from emerging economies such as India and China have a responsi-
bility to ensure that these drug components are safe and are made under appropriate conditions. These 
companies also must address proactively, to the greatest extent possible, the risk of economically moti-
vated adulteration during stages of manufacturing. 
Modern quality systems, including supplier management and risk assessment, must be required to  
ensure drug safety and address gaps in the FDA’s cGMP requirements. Testing methods and standards 
must be continually reevaluated and updated to help protect against contamination and intentional 
adulteration.
On March 14 and 15, 2011, the Pew Health Group convened a roundtable meeting of key stakeholders 
to discuss concerns over safety of the U.S. drug supply and consider potential policy responses. Par-
ticipants included representatives of the FDA, USP, state regulators, major pharmaceutical manufactur-
ing and distribution trade associations, pharmacy organizations and medical professional groups, and 
academic and consumer organizations (see Appendix B for a complete list of participants). 
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2.  Require clear, strong, quality agreements for suppliers. Quality expectations should be clearly 
established for, and contractually agreed to, by suppliers. Agreements should acknowledge U.S. 
quality requirements and establish that, if necessary, FDA officials will have access to a supplier’s 
plant. Agreements should also require suppliers and contractors to report manufacturing changes 
to the purchasing company. If possible, quality agreements should be included as a part of main 
supplier contracts to clearly set expectations.
3.  Increase information sharing among industry to ensure supply chain safety. Industry should 
share information on suppliers, risk signals, and other global market data that might help to 
ensure product quality and safety. Legal barriers to information sharing should be actively ad-
dressed through antitrust waivers, if necessary, or safe-harbor provisions in contracts. 
C.  enhance documentation and transparency of the upstream manufacturing supply chain 
through legal requirements.
1.  Companies should know and be able to document the companies involved in their up-
stream manufacturing supply chain. Drug companies must know the entities involved in the 
manufacture, processing, and transportation of their drugs and active ingredients. This documen-
tation should be available to regulators on demand. 
2.  Require all drug companies to state country of origin for their drugs and active pharmaceu-
tical ingredients on their websites. Pharmaceuticals should not be subject to less transparency 
than other consumer products. Country of origin should be listed for both the finished drug and 
the drug’s active ingredients. While pharmacy dispensing may make country-of-origin labeling 
on drug bottles less useful for consumers, this information could be made available to the public 
through other means, such as package inserts or on a company’s website.
d. Improve testing standards
1.  Industry and regulators must continually seek to develop better testing methods to ensure 
the identity, purity and safety of drugs. Manufacturers must be responsible for ensuring the 
purity of their drugs and drug components through robust testing methods, and should review 
and update analytic methods in an ongoing manner. Regulators and industry stakeholders agree 
that better methods for detecting and measuring drug contamination are needed. In addition to 
improving their methods, drug companies could use multiple assays as a check against bad actors 
who might try to design fake ingredients that are able to fool specific tests.
2.  Require continual assessment and updating of public testing standards. Compendial testing 
standards should be regularly reviewed to ensure adequacy. The FDA and USP should work to-
gether to ensure that public standards are robust and up to date, and identify and prioritize those 
assays that need to be updated and/or revised.
PolICy reCoMMendatIonS
a. require 21st-century quality systems to protect drug safety through statute and regulation. 
1.  Companies selling drugs in the United States should have in place a quality system to 
ensure the safety and integrity of their products, including drug ingredients manufactured 
by a contractor or supplier. A quality systems model is a holistic, preventive strategy to ensure 
that the drugs we take are safe. A quality systems provision in legislation would specify basic key 
components, but would not conflict with detailed technical requirements, such as those found in 
cGMPs (which are established through the FDA’s regulation and permit recognition of evolving 
industry technologies). The FDA has shown clearly in guidance how a quality systems approach 
is harmonized with and can support adherence to cGMPs.
2.  Quality systems should have the following key components (see recommendations B and D 
for additional discussion):
a.  Management responsibility: Management should be responsible for establishing the quality 
systems and ensuring that they are adequately resourced and function appropriately. 
b.  Supplier management: Manufacturers should assess suppliers and contractors prior to en-
gagement with them, and should perform periodic on-site audits to ensure adherence to qual-
ity and safety standards. Pre-assessment and periodic on-site audits are not currently required 
under U.S. cGMPs. 
c.  Risk assessment: Companies should establish procedures to identify, monitor and evaluate 
risk factors that could impact product quality, safety, strength, purity and identity. 
d.  Assessment and revision of analytical methods: Manufacturers should review and, where 
necessary, update tests to ensure that they are robust and are able to screen for substances that 
could affect product quality, safety, strength, purity and identity.
B.  Industry should also independently improve its control of contract manufacturers and  
suppliers.
1.  Strengthen supplier contracts to facilitate and improve oversight. Contracts should establish 
the authority of the purchaser to conduct on-site audits of suppliers. When necessary, contracts 
should specify that the drug company has the right to audit subcontractors involved in manufac-
turing the suppliers’ products. Contracts should also specifically require drug company approval 
of any changes in ingredients sourcing or manufacturing processes. 
PHARmACEuTiCAL mANuFACTuRiNG: GLOBALiZATiON AND QuALiTy mANAGEmENT
aFter HeParIn: PROTECTInG COnSUMERS FROM THE RISkS OF SUBSTAnDARD AnD COUnTERFEIT DRUGS 45
2.1 Overview
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety and efficacy of human and 
veterinary drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical devices, the U.S. food supply, cosmet-
ics, dietary supplements and products that emit radiation.327 
The precarious state of FDA resourcing and capacity is broadly recognized. The regulatory demands 
placed on the agency far exceed its ability to respond, according to a 2007 FDA advisory committee 
report that outlined serious scientific shortcomings within the agency.328 Between 1988 and 2007, Con-
gress passed 123 new laws requiring FDA action, but according to the report, the agency was allocated 
only a 9 percent staffing increase through appropriations.329 The FDA’s Principal Deputy Commissioner 
from 2009 to 2010, Dr. Joshua Sharfstein, testified at a Congressional hearing in March 2010 that the 
agency does not have the resources and authority it needs to ensure the safety of imported drugs and 
components, and is not currently able to prevent another tragedy like the heparin adulteration (see case 
study 1).330 
The FDA has received some important augmentations to its budget in recent years. Total enacted appro-
priations, including user fees, were $2.63 billion, $3.25 billion and $3.67 billion for fiscal years 2009, 
2010 and 2011, respectively (see figure 13).331–334 The agency also received a supplemental appropria-
tion of $150 million in June 2008 to support regulatory activities in response to globalization, in partic-
ular food supply safety programs.335,336 Funding allocations for the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER) and related field activities in the Office of Regulatory Affairs (the office that conducts 
inspections, among other functions) have also increased, although at a slightly lower rate than overall 
appropriations. With these funds, FDA has begun to address issues such as understaffing and informa-
tion technology (IT) capacity, but as outlined in this chapter, serious capacity and structural problems 
remain, and they weaken the agency’s ability to regulate drug manufacturing and importation. 
The FDA inspects foreign plants that make drugs and ingredients for the United States at much lower 
rates than it inspects domestic sites.337 IT systems for tracking drug manufacturing sites are archaic and 
contain data-entry errors.338,339 An estimated 20 million shipments of FDA-regulated goods entered the 
United States in 2010; however, border assessments are hampered by data systems that contain errors 
and do not permit effective risk-based targeting (see section 2.3.3). Oversight is also undermined by the 
FDA’s lack of enforcement tools and needed authority, such as the power to mandate a recall or to sub-
poena documents for investigations.   
BARRIERS TO FDA OVERSIGHTC H A P T E R2
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Act (PDUFA) of 1992.348,349 PDUFA funds do not cover PAIs for generic drug products. Foreign GMP in-
spections, when done, are most often completed at the same time as the PAI.350 By contrast, many more 
ongoing GMP inspections, separate from PAIs, are conducted for U.S. sites.351 The FDA uses a risk-based 
assessment model to decide which plants to inspect for GMP, but the agency keeps separate risk-based 
lists for domestic and foreign plants.352 
Sometimes, even PAIs are not performed. In September 2003, the FDA eliminated mandatory PAIs in 
certain categories and instead implemented a risk-assessment scheme to determine when a PAI should 
be performed.353,354 In addition, foreign companies making drugs that are not subject to FDA approv-
als, such as many over-the-counter medicines for the U.S. market (see section 2.2.2), may never receive 
PAIs—in practice, leaving them very unlikely to ever receive an inspection by the FDA. 
When FDA inspections do occur, the GAO reports that non-U.S. plants face different scrutiny than U.S. 
sites: for logistical reasons, inspections of foreign facilities are shorter than those for domestic sites, and 
while many domestic inspections are surprise visits, foreign inspections are preannounced to ensure that 
necessary personnel are present.355 According to one industry expert, foreign firms typically have more 
than a year to prepare for FDA inspections because the agency is that far behind on its inspection queue. 
In addition, when the FDA discovers deficiencies at foreign sites, resource constraints may mean the 
agency does not return for more than two years, if at all. The GAO found that the FDA reinspected only 
four out of 15 noncompliant foreign plants. In those follow-up inspections, which occurred two to five 
years after the original inspections, three of the four were found to have additional deficiencies.356 
With recent increases in budget appropriations (foreign inspection resources rose from $12 million to 
$41 million in fiscal year 2009), the FDA has begun to build its foreign inspections program.357 How-
ever, the agency is still unable to inspect non-U.S. plants with sufficient frequency.358
In fiscal year 2009, the FDA inspected 1,015 domestic sites359 and 424 foreign pharmaceutical manufac-
turing sites in the European Union (E.U.) and other parts of the world.360 In the United States, the FDA 
is close to meeting its statutory requirement to inspect factories once every two years. In contrast, over-
seas plants are inspected every nine years on average.361 The frequency of foreign inspections is difficult 
to determine because the FDA’s current database systems do not provide an accurate count of the num-
ber of overseas sites producing drugs and drug components for the U.S. market.362,363 The FDA estimates 
that 3,765 foreign pharmaceutical facilities were subject to potential FDA inspection in fiscal year 2009 
(identified through registration and U.S. Customs databases), but this could include companies that are 
registered with the FDA but may never have shipped product to the United States.364 The FDA registra-
tion is not equivalent to permission to market a drug, although it is a prerequisite.365 Registering with 
the FDA is a simple process that is free to the registrant, and some sites may register to obtain a competi-
tive or marketing advantage associated with being “FDA registered.”
China is home to the highest number of sites subject to FDA inspection outside of the United States 
(920 in fiscal year 2009), but receives the lowest levels of oversight compared with other countries. The 
2.2  insufficient scrutiny of overseas 
manufacturing
2.2.1 Foreign and domestic inspection disparities
One of the FDA’s most important tools for ensuring the safety of drugs sold in the United States is the 
inspection of factories to verify compliance with GMP standards. The volume of drugs destined for 
the U.S. market makes it impossible to test samples of all products before they reach patients. Check-
ing manufacturing quality, normally through inspections, is a critical preventive measure to protect the 
public from unsafe pharmaceuticals. 
The FDCA, written when most drugs were manufactured domestically, requires regular, biennial inspec-
tions only for U.S.-based sites.344 Although FDA inspectors travel abroad, the FDA’s foreign inspection 
service lacks the resources to inspect manufacturing sites with any meaningful regularity (see section 
2.3.1).345 The FDA reported that at least 242 foreign manufacturers of active pharmaceutical ingredients 
(API) had shipped product into the United States in 1999 without being inspected by the FDA.346 As 
many as 2,394 overseas plants on the FDA’s inspection planning list have never been inspected by the 
agency, according to FDA data analyzed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).347 How-
ever, the FDA does not know with certainty how many of these sites are actively shipping product to the 
U.S. market. 
Most inspections of foreign sites are pre-approval inspections (PAI), which are a component of a market-
ing application approval and are supported by special funding through the Prescription Drug User Fee 
Figure 13
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2.2.2 Over-the-counter products receive less scrutiny
Plants making OTC medications or active ingredients receive less FDA scrutiny than those making pre-
scription drugs, particularly when those plants are overseas. There are at least two reasons: first, the vast 
majority of the FDA’s foreign inspections are pre-approval  inspections,374 which do not apply for most 
OTC products.* Ibuprofen, acetaminophen and acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin)—three active ingredients for 
which the majority of U.S. imports originated in China in 2009—are among the OTC products in this 
category (see figure 9). Secondly, the FDA considers OTC products to be lower risk than prescription 
products within the agency’s risk-ranking model for plant oversight.375 Despite this oversight disparity, 
numerous experts interviewed for this paper assert that the risks of GMP failures for OTC products are 
not intrinsically lower than for prescription products.376–379 Indeed, an auditor of Chinese manufacturing 
facilities considers the lack of oversight of the OTC sector to be a major problem, because large product 
volumes make it easy for suppliers to covertly introduce cheaper materials not certified for pharmaceu-
tical use.380 While the United States rarely inspects overseas OTC plants, the E.U. authorities conduct 
more frequent OTC inspections. This oversight has sometimes identified quality issues that resulted in a 
suspension or withdrawal of approval to produce for E.U. markets. 
2.3 FDA capacity and information systems 
2.3.1 FDA’s inspection staff 
The FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) is responsible for all agency regulatory activities, including 
oversight of drug and device manufacturing through physical inspection of plants and products in the 
United States, outside of the United States and at import. Despite industry globalization trends, ORA 
personnel and financial resources remain largely focused on domestic oversight. Until fiscal year 2009, 
the FDA did not have dedicated staff for foreign inspections; qualified employees would volunteer to 
travel abroad. The FDA estimated in 2007 that approximately 335 ORA employees were qualified to 
conduct foreign inspections, although only 102 did so in the year prior.381 In fiscal year 2009, the FDA 
created a “cadre” of 15 inspectors dedicated to inspecting foreign manufacturing sites. These inspectors 
were based in the United States and performed about a third of all the FDA’s foreign inspections in that 
year.382 However, the GAO notes that these staffing increases have not yet resulted in sufficient levels of 
foreign oversight.383 The FDA committed a major part of its increased 2009 appropriations to hiring new 
staff, with a primary goal of bolstering ORA’s inspectorate. However, hiring and retaining employees has 
been historically difficult, in part because of competition from the higher-paying private sector.384 
To improve its overseas presence, the FDA has opened offices in key geographic regions: three in China, 
two in India and three in Latin America, with planned offices in the Middle East and Europe.385 These 
FDA inspected only 5.6 percent of Chinese sites in fiscal year 2009 (with 52 inspections that year, up 
from 19 in 2007).366 Over an eight-year period (2002–2009), the FDA conducted 182 inspections in 
China (out of 920 total facilities), compared to nearly a combined 900 inspections in Ireland, Switzer-
land, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany (out of 938 total facilities; see figure 14).367,368 
The emphasis on European inspections is surprising considering that regulatory oversight and standards 
for E.U. manufacturers are generally on par with those in the United States (see section 2.4.4), and thus 
E.U. sites are arguably at lower risk for quality and safety issues. FDA inspections of Indian sites were 
more frequent than in China, but still less frequent than in Europe. The FDA conducted 322 inspections 
of Indian sites between fiscal years 2002 and 2009.369,370 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations (EFPIA), which regularly surveys its member pharmaceutical companies on 
the number of regulatory inspections that occur at their sites, has also pointed out inspectional overlap 
between the E.U. and the United States. In 2009, members reported 47 inspections of U.S. plants by 
E.U. regulators, and 102 inspections of E.U. plants by the FDA.371  
Figure 14
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* OTC medications fall into two categories: (1) those approved under a drug marketing application, and (2) those that comply with an existing OTC 
monograph. Manufacturers of OTCs in this second category are not required to submit pre-market applications to the FDA that describe manufacturing 
processes and sites. These products may be marketed without specific FDA approval and are therefore not subject to pre-approval inspection. 
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heparin (see case study 1). OTC drug manufacturers, which most often do not submit marketing appli-
cations, are required under cGMP to maintain records of the suppliers of their incoming components.397 
However, the FDA may not ever review these records unless visiting a plant for an inspection, which is 
rare for foreign OTC manufacturers (see section 2.2.2). 
2.3.3 Border assessments and importer oversight
More than 300,000 shipments of pharmaceuticals entered the United States in 2007, double the num-
ber in 2002.398 Agents from Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a division of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, have the main responsibility for reviewing incoming goods and notifying the FDA of 
imports that fall under FDA jurisdiction. The FDA works closely with CBP agents to review information 
for these imported goods and decide whether additional information or product sampling is needed.399
As the volume of imported drugs grows, so does the volume of work for FDA reviewers and CBP agents. 
Current data system limitations seriously impair the FDA’s ability to prioritize review of imported prod-
ucts. Carl Nielsen, former director of the Division of Import Operations and Policy at the FDA, noted in 
2007 testimony that the FDA reviewers check technical requirements such as appropriate product reg-
istration and listing information, rather than data on manufacturing quality or product safety.400 Access-
ing databases to determine other information, such as whether the drug or API has a current marketing 
approval, can be cumbersome and extremely time-consuming.401 CBP is developing a new Automated 
Commercial Environment (ACE) system to integrate FDA data on manufacturing sites with Customs 
data on importers and exporters. However, after more than a decade of development and billions of dol-
lars invested, this system was still not fully operational as of May 2010.402–405 In the system’s absence, the 
FDA has begun to test a program called PREDICT (Predictive Risk-based Evaluation for Dynamic Import 
Compliance Targeting), which combines existing Customs data on pharmaceutical manufacturing sites 
with additional relevant information (e.g., results of facility inspections, previous product sampling and 
other risk rankings).406 PREDICT would replace the admissibility screening functions of the FDA’s legacy 
OASIS system.407 The FDA has implemented PREDICT for imported food, and plans to use the system to 
monitor imported drugs and medical devices.  As of March 2011, PREDICT was implemented for drug 
commodities in four FDA districts.408 
One means of ensuring that border agents have better information to assess imported drugs is to require 
importers to supply the information. Greater oversight of importers could include registration with the 
FDA as well as a requirement to provide documents that attest to the quality and safety of the imported 
drug or drug product. The FDA has taken a step toward such oversight through its Secure Supply Chain 
Pilot Program, which would permit abbreviated border reviews in exchange for additional recordkeeping 
on product movement and adherence to certain distribution safety standards. However, this voluntary 
program does not require documentation of GMP compliance.409
Finally, the FDA’s authority at the border has some notable limitations. If a foreign facility refuses to 
permit an FDA inspection, the agency cannot use this as a reason to refuse products made at those 
foreign offices have helped the agency develop relationships with foreign stakeholders as well as deepen 
their understanding of foreign regulatory systems, according to the GAO’s September 2010 report.386 
With the focus on relationship-building, however, the staff in these foreign offices has performed few 
inspections of manufacturing sites. For example, from June 2009 to June 2010, the FDA staff based in 
offices in India and China conducted 24 inspections in those countries, while the U.S.-based FDA staff 
conducted 120.387
2.3.2 Limitations of tracking systems and data management
Outdated IT systems used for tracking drug-manufacturing sites impede access to data and inhibit the 
effective use of the FDA’s limited resources.388 The FDA cannot manage or effectively use the information 
it collects about drugs, manufacturing sites and imports because the underlying data are often unreliable 
and not in a format readily amenable to data comparison or analysis.389
The two main databases that the FDA uses to track manufacturing sites have problems that call into 
question the accuracy of their content.390 The Operational and Administrative System for Import Sup-
port (OASIS) database, which lists manufacturing sites of imported products as entered by Customs 
agents, contains multiple spelling errors, duplicate entries and redundant identification numbers. The 
Drug Registration and Listing System (DRLS) database tracks plant registration information, but includes 
many facilities that register with the FDA, even if they do not manufacture drugs for the United States. 
In addition, some facilities in this database do not update their information annually as required, and 
the FDA does not verify registration accuracy.391 The data in these two main systems cannot be electroni-
cally integrated, according to the agency, nor can the systems interact with one another. FDA staff must 
compare these data manually.392,* 
As discussed, because of database inaccuracies, FDA officials are unable to know exactly how many 
foreign sites produce pharmaceuticals for the U.S. market.393 Such problems can contribute to errors, 
such as with Baxter’s heparin product when the FDA confused the plant processing the active ingredient 
with another similarly named site (see case study 1). The FDA recognizes the need to reform its IT infra-
structure and has begun to create new systems. However, harmonization of data still presents significant 
challenges, including lack of sufficient personnel to effect and sustain necessary data transitions.394
Limited reporting requirements for industry also impede data collection. The FDA does not clearly 
require industry to report entities involved in the manufacture of their products beyond the sites that 
process their finished active ingredients. Current statute requires industry to report the facilities used for 
the manufacture, processing and packing of a drug in drug marketing applications,395 but FDA guidance 
only suggests that this should include, as appropriate, manufacturing facilities for finished drugs as well 
as bulk drug substances.396 Although information about precursor ingredient manufacturing sites is not 
always relevant, it can be important when a drug has a complicated manufacturing supply chain, such as 
* A third database, the Field Accomplishments and Compliance Tracking System (FACTS), houses information entered by FDA agents concerning inspection 
results.
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In addition, penalties for drug counterfeiting and adulteration are too small to be adequate deterrents. 
With some exceptions, the FDCA sets criminal penalties for violation of the Act (including adultera-
tion, misbranding and counterfeiting) at a maximum of $10,000 or three years in prison, and then only 
when intent to defraud or mislead is established. Otherwise, penalties are capped at $1,000 or one year 
in prison.418 These penalties are far lower than, for example, penalties associated with narcotics traffick-
ing.419 Counterfeiting can be prosecuted under trademark law, with a maximum sentence of 10 years, 
but the FDCA route is the most common for counterfeit drug cases.420 The utility of criminal penalties 
becomes further limited as drug manufacturing moves outside of the United States because the FDA 
may not be able to prosecute pharmaceutical companies overseas if foreign governments are unwilling to 
cooperate. Additional penalty options such as asset forfeiture may be more easily assessed against for-
eign entities (for example, if the assets to be seized were within the United States). Civil penalty options 
would also provide greater enforcement flexibility, but barring limited exceptions, the FDA cannot assess 
civil penalties for violations of the FDCA in relation to drugs.
2.4.2 Legal accountability of responsible individuals at companies 
Enforcement may also be hindered by the lack of clearly established individual responsibility for product 
quality and safety within each company. For example, while GMP requires the existence of a quality-
control unit that is responsible for drug and component quality,421 companies are not required to appoint 
and name a specific employee with individual responsibility for ensuring product quality and safety. In 
contrast, for devices sold in the United States, QSR requires a named management representative who is 
responsible for implementation and oversight of quality systems.422 In the E.U., a directive for companies 
with pharmaceutical manufacturing authorizations stipulates that the safety and quality of all drugs and 
active ingredients must be certified by a “qualified person” through signature.423 
The FDA has indicated its intent to hold executives within industry accountable for violations of the 
FDCA, and specifically has suggested it will make increased use of a 1975 legal precedent, the Park 
Doctrine, also called the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine.424–427 These individuals may be held ac-
countable for misdemeanor violations of the FDCA—even violations that may be unknown to them—if 
due to their position of authority they should have known about and been able to correct or prevent the 
violations.428 In Park, the Supreme Court ruled that the FDCA imposes on responsible corporate offi-
cials the duty to seek out and remedy violations, “and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will 
insure that violations will not occur.”429 This responsibility exists independent of knowledge of, or intent 
to commit, a violation. Although the precedent has rarely been used since a period of frequent use in the 
1970s,430 in 2010 the FDA repeatedly signaled its intent to once again pursue prosecutions of executives 
under the Park Doctrine.431–433,* 
plants. However, the FDA does have this power for imported food products.410 Further, under current 
regulations, when the FDA and CBP identify and refuse a violative product, that product may still make 
its way to the U.S. market. The FDA is authorized to refuse products at the border that appear to be 
adulterated or misbranded,411 but statutory remedies include reexportation of the refused item.412 This 
may allow potentially harmful drugs to be reshipped into the United States.
2.4 FDA enforcement
2.4.1 Limitations of current enforcement tools and authorities
The FDA lacks several key authorities that would permit more effective oversight of overseas manufac-
turing. Though the FDA has complete legal discretion under the statutory approval standard regarding 
whether to allow a drug to be sold in the United States, the agency’s control over that product after ap-
proval is more limited. The FDA does not have the authority to order a drug recall, nor may it halt prod-
uct distribution on its own (it can do both for medical devices, the latter authority known in the device 
world as administrative detention). If the FDA finds it necessary to forcibly remove a pharmaceutical 
product from the market, it must go through the courts to request a seizure,413,* and a separate seizure 
action is needed for each court district where the product may be found.414 In 2010, the FDA seized 11 
lots of heparin from Celsus Laboratories, Inc., in Chicago after it discovered oversulfated chondroitin 
sulfate contamination in the products (the same substance associated with U.S. adverse events in 2007 
and 2008). The FDA stated that this action was necessary because the company’s efforts to inform con-
sumers about the possible contamination were not sufficient to ensure a recall of the product.415 
The FDA also lacks the general authority to subpoena documents or witnesses for violations of the 
FDCA, and may not be able to thoroughly investigate safety issues without outside help such as from the 
U.S. Department of Justice. This may be a limiting factor for investigations into serious safety violations.† 
(Granting subpoena powers to federal agencies is not uncommon—at least 355 such authorities have 
been granted to executive branch entities.416) Further, the FDA’s authority to access manufacturing sites 
and records overseas is insufficiently delineated in statute, and could allow for challenges to the agency’s 
inspection activities for foreign sites.‡ The FDA also reports that it cannot, in most cases, justify detain-
ing an imported drug or drug substance based on the refusal of the manufacturer to submit to an FDA 
inspection.417
* The FDA may also enjoin further manufacturing through the courts.
† The FDA can examine drug-manufacturing documents during its inspections of drug facilities under section 704 of the FDCA. But this general authority 
is limited to the inspection context and does not authorize the FDA to summon witnesses or require production of documents, which can be critical for 
investigations. In addition, issues can arise during inspections about the scope of authority for document examination, which can lead to company refusals 
to cooperate (FDA Investigations Operations Manual, Section 5.2.5.2: Refusal to Permit Access to or Copying of Records). In these situations, the FDA 
must seek an inspection warrant from a federal court (FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual, Section 6-3-Inspection Warrants). Subpoena power is a more 
comprehensive and direct mechanism for obtaining specific documents and witness testimony.
‡ The Supreme Court has upheld the legal principle that Congress must express clear legislative intent for a statute to apply to entities overseas. “It is 
a longstanding principle of American Law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.’” EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949)). 
* While Park prosecutions have historically resulted in small fines, the range of potential penalties for misdemeanor violations now includes substantial fines, 
jail time and debarment or exclusion from working for companies doing business with, or under the jurisdiction of, HHS and the FDA. 
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luctant to share confidential information related to public health risks with the FDA because the agency 
cannot always guarantee that the information will not become public under U.S. law.* Although the FDA 
has entered into more than 30 agreements with regulatory bodies in different countries to share some in-
spectional and other non-public information,440 Congress has yet to clearly establish the FDA’s ability to 
share information with other regulatory agencies and foreign governments in a protected manner. Such 
protections would likely increase the amount of information the agency receives. In the aftermath of the 
heparin adulteration, a member of Congress asked the FDA if it was willing or able to share information 
with the Chinese government in an effort to investigate that case, and the FDA replied that it was con-
strained in doing so by U.S. law.441
2.4.4 Harmonization of international standards and inspections 
As drug manufacturing becomes increasingly global, the FDA, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
and other regulatory bodies have begun efforts to harmonize standards, share information and leverage 
each other’s regulatory activities. Through the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, the FDA and its E.U. and Japanese 
counterparts, together with industry representatives, have established quality assurance guidelines 
(Q1–Q10) that are now almost universally adopted as guidance by the FDA through publication in the 
Federal Register. 
The agency has engaged with the EMA and Australia’s Therapeutic Goods Administration on a pilot 
program to share inspectional information and conduct some joint inspections of active-ingredient 
manufacturing sites.442 The program has reportedly resulted in meaningful increases in information shar-
ing,443 and in 2011 was made permanent.444 However, these joint inspections may not always represent 
a substantial relief of FDA resources because FDA inspectors are still performing their own assessment 
of the site. Wyeth Europa, whose facility received a joint inspection by the FDA and the Irish Medi-
cal Bureau in Europe in 2009, reported that the reviews were consistent with one another, but that the 
double inspection entailed a duplication of work for the company, which had to deliver a separate report 
for each agency.445 An official at the FDA’s Office of Regional Operations reported in September 2010 
that the agency’s goal is to conduct joint inspections in which EMA and the FDA look at different parts 
of the same plant, and that the agency will be using information from other regulatory agencies within 
risk determinations.446 As of January 1, 2011, the FDA is also a member of the Pharmaceutical Inspec-
tion Co-operation Scheme, which is an agreement between health authorities fostering cooperation on 
pharmaceutical GMP inspections.447
Revived use of the Park Doctrine may incentivize responsible corporate officials to proactively evaluate 
the potential for upstream supply chain violations. However, updating existing statute to more explicitly 
state management responsibilities with regard to manufacturing quality and safety could further encour-
age compliance, and provide a more reliable tool for enforcement. 
2.4.3 Increased information flow to FDA needed
The FDA faces many obstacles to the collection of needed data from drug manufacturers as well as other 
regulatory agencies. Drug companies are not required to inform the FDA of many types of quality or 
safety issues that could present risks to U.S. patients, such as suspected counterfeiting, serious supplier 
quality problems or drug theft, and do so only on a voluntary basis. Current reporting requirements 
exist (within the FDA’s Field Alert Program),434 but have limitations. They do not apply to manufacturers 
of OTC products, and are also constrained to a few specific issues: distributed drugs that are mislabeled, 
contaminated or do not meet required specifications. In addition, industry whistle-blowers wishing 
to alert their supervisors or the FDA about potential violations of the FDCA are not clearly covered by 
specific whistle-blower protections. Existing whistle-blower provisions have limitations; for example, 
the employee protections within the False Claims Act are tied to company retaliations for the filing 
of a whistle-blower lawsuit, which some employees may not wish to do, and protections within the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act do not cover reporting of violations to supervisors.* Compliance with the current 
Field Alert Program is also imperfect. In a recent case, the FDA chastised McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 
a division of Johnson & Johnson, for not reporting consumer complaints about what was eventually 
discovered to be a chemical contamination of OTC medicine.435 Companies may be particularly reticent 
to share information on counterfeits (not required under the Field Alert Program) because of fears that 
negative publicity will impact sales.436 The Pharmaceutical Security Institute, a not-for-profit organiza-
tion formed by drug companies to collect information on counterfeits and develop systems to address 
the issue, does not provide health authorities with full access to its extensive databank.437
The FDA is limited in its ability to receive or share certain kinds of information with other regulatory 
agencies, both domestic and international. The FDCA prevents the FDA from sharing trade secret in-
formation, including with other regulators, even in the interest of enforcement or public health.438 The 
agency may share commercial, confidential information with foreign government officials, but must 
overcome significant regulatory hurdles to do so.439,† In addition, foreign regulatory bodies may be re-
* Whistle-blower protections created by the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729–3733) apply when the violation in question can be shown to have created 
a false claim against the government, such as billing of Medicare for drugs that a company has promoted for an unapproved indication. The law is not clear 
whether manufacturing quality failures would fit within this scope, and despite a November 2010 GlaxoSmithKline settlement under the False Claims Act 
for drug manufacturing defects, courts have not resolved the issue. In addition, whistle-blower protections under the False Claims Act provide remedies to 
be “made whole” when a company retaliates against an employee for bringing a false claims (qui tam) suit, but it does not offer such retaliation protections 
for the act of information reporting itself. Protections under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-204) establish penalties for retaliation against any 
person alerting law enforcement officers to violations of federal law. However, this act does not extend such penalties to retaliations against persons reporting 
violations to their supervisors, and does not contain provisions allowing a whistle-blower to be “made whole” by the retaliating company. 
† In order to share commercial, confidential information with foreign government officials, 21 CFR 20.89 requires the Secretary of HHS to receive from 
the foreign government a written commitment not to disclose shared data, and establishing its authority to protect the data. Even still, the Secretary must 
receive written authorization from the company who owns the data, unless the Secretary makes a determination that sharing the information without such 
authorization is in the interest of the public health. * The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
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FDA and GAO representatives agreed that a unique facility identifier for plants would help improve 
tracking. An FDA participant said it would help to have the authority to require the provision of ad-
ditional information with imported products, such as documentation of manufacturer compliance with 
regulations, and establishing that the drug meets identity, safety and purity standards. An FDA official 
noted that, unlike most other countries that require companies to show why their product should be al-
lowed into the country, U.S. regulators must prove that there is something wrong with a product to keep 
it out of the country. 
There was widespread agreement among participants that penalties for drug counterfeiters must be 
stronger. Several speakers made the point that it is currently more profitable and easier to counterfeit 
and adulterate medicines than to sell illicit drugs. A March 2011 interagency report to the Office of the 
Vice President also calls for increased penalties.449 Penalties provide a deterrent only when coupled with 
enforcement, a fact noted by a number of stakeholders concerned that criminals may increasingly target 
the pharmaceutical pipeline. 
FDA representatives acknowledged that the agency needs adequate funding for inspections and updated 
IT systems, as well as novel enforcement tools and new authorities (for example, more comprehensive 
requirements for industry to report quality problems to the FDA; currently, such reporting is required 
only in relation to batches of finished products, not components or counterfeits). In addition, FDA 
personnel suggested that the agency needs mandatory recall authority, subpoena authority (to allow for 
effective investigations) and authority to keep a product out of the country if the foreign producer of that 
product delays, limits or refuses inspection. In addition, agency staff indicated that the FDA now lacks 
the authority to destroy adulterated products at the border. 
Finally, three participants stressed the risks associated with OTC drugs, which are produced in large 
quantities with little regulatory oversight, often by smaller manufacturers with few quality controls.
PolICy reCoMMendatIonS*
a. Increase Fda oversight of overseas manufacturing
1.  Significantly increase FDA foreign inspections. The FDA must inspect overseas plants at a rate 
that is high enough to encourage consistent conformance with quality and safety standards. Iden-
tified cases of noncompliance must be followed by appropriate sanctions. Inspections should be 
prioritized based on assessments of risk, but no plant should go uninspected indefinitely. If pos-
sible, the inspections should be unannounced as they are for U.S. inspections. Cooperation and 
coordination with local regulators could help achieve this goal. The FDA should also ensure that 
it inspects foreign plants making finished drugs, finished APIs or bulk APIs at least once before 
these facilities may export any such products to the United States. Increasing the FDA inspection 
rates will require more resources.
2.5 Pew conference and policy 
recommendations
At the Pew Health Group roundtable conference (March 14 and 15, 2011; see Appendices B and C  
for list of attendees and full agenda), participants agreed that it is important to improve the FDA’s over-
sight of foreign manufacturing. There was clear agreement among generic and brand industry repre-
sentatives, API producers and consumer groups that inspections of foreign facilities should occur at the 
same rate as U.S. facility inspections and should be prioritized based on risk, as recommended by the 
GAO. One industry participant argued strongly that regulatory inspections should be unannounced 
whenever possible. 
Several participants argued that the FDA must leverage the capacity of third parties, particularly other 
regulatory agencies, to achieve needed increased oversight. Suggestions included conducting coopera-
tive inspections, reciprocal recognition of inspections by other qualified regulatory agencies and use of 
independent accredited inspectors. An industry participant suggested that the FDA could immediately 
alleviate resources by reducing its inspectional activity in the E.U. by relying on the results of inspec-
tions carried out by European regulators. One specific suggestion to the FDA was that the agency should 
participate in EudraGMP, a database launched by the European Medicines Agency in 2007 that catalogs 
suppliers with E.U. GMP certificates. A GAO official similarly encouraged the agency to take advantage 
of as much third-party information as is available.
FDA Deputy Commissioner John Taylor indicated that the FDA intends to make better use of third-party 
sources of information, and sought improved collaboration with foreign regulatory counterparts. The 
GAO called the FDA’s effort to set up foreign offices a good first step, but noted that the staff in those 
new, small offices needs better feedback from headquarters on what it should be doing and how to man-
age a workload that can become overwhelming. 
Representatives of generic drug and active-ingredient manufacturers spoke in support of new industry 
fees to cover the costs of increased foreign inspections and create a level playing field for U.S.-based 
manufacturers. However, a representative of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) suggested that, while user fees have worked well in other contexts, Congress should offer 
additional appropriations so that the FDA can better oversee globalized manufacturing. FDA officials 
suggested that a potential ancillary benefit of facility registration fees would be to disincentivize foreign 
plants that do not export to the United States from registering with the FDA purely to obtain a “seal 
of approval.” When such fees were introduced for medical devices, the number of registered facilities 
dropped by one-third.448
Stakeholders also discussed measures to improve the FDA’s knowledge of foreign manufacturers and 
imported products. The GAO speaker delineated challenges to the FDA’s database systems for overseas 
plants and emphasized the need to improve information entry for imported products at the border. The * The recommendations in this report have been informed by the roundtable discussions and presentations, but are not intended to reflect a consensus 
position and may not reflect the views of every participating organization. 
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B. ensure adequate Fda resources 
1.  Consider new industry fees to support increased foreign inspections. Manufacturer regis-
tration fees would represent a significant income source that the FDA could use to increase the 
number of inspections it conducts overseas; to support ongoing improvements of systems the 
agency uses to target inspections; and to track foreign manufacturing sites. 
2.  Consider an importer fee. Assessing a fee on importers would provide further funding for bor-
der oversight operations. An importer fee should not be required of manufacturers that import 
products if they are already assessed a fee when they register with the FDA. 
3.  Ensure that other appropriations also increase. The FDA has estimated that in fiscal year 2009 
the cost of a foreign inspection was between $60,000 and $62,500.452 To avoid exclusive reliance 
on industry fees to support expansion of the FDA inspections, increased public appropriations 
will also be necessary. 
C. Improve Fda infrastructure and tracking systems 
1.  Fix tracking systems for manufacturing sites. Current tracking systems for manufacturing sites 
contain duplicates and errors, and must be overhauled to ensure accuracy and interoperability. 
The FDA must more diligently verify manufacturer registrations to ensure that information is 
current and correct. Updated systems should also be able to easily interface with each other and 
with risk-assessment systems to guide oversight and inspections. 
2.  Establish a unique facility identifier for manufacturers, importers and brokers. Manufac-
turers, importers and brokers should be required to submit this unique number to the FDA at 
various points, such as site registration and importation. This will help with accurate facility 
identification and will help prevent mistakes due to data errors and duplicate entries. One option 
for a unique facility identifier is D-U-N-S (Data Universal Numbering System)—a widely used 
system for identifying business entities.
d. Strengthen oversight of drugs and bulk drug substances at import
1.  Ensure that robust risk-assessment systems are used to guide border screening. The FDA 
is implementing a risk-assessment system called PREDICT to assess imported food, devices and 
drugs.  
2.  Give the FDA authority to destroy products at the border. The FDA is currently authorized 
to refuse drug products at the border that appear to be adulterated or misbranded, but statutory 
remedies include reexportation of these potentially violative products.453 This may allow harmful 
drugs to reenter the United States. The FDA should have the power to destroy drugs and drug 
products that it determines could pose a threat of injury or death.
2.  Use comprehensive risk assessment to prioritize inspections. Because the frequency of 
inspections will depend on the availability of resources, the task of prioritizing oversight should 
rely on an intelligent risk-based assessment system, incorporating factors such as inspection 
histories, counterfeit risk and environmental influences. The FDA has begun to assess the risk of 
economically motivated adulteration of various APIs; as of October 2010, the agency had risk-
ranked more than 1,000 API products.450
3.  Create a meaningful, dedicated foreign inspectorate. The FDA’s foreign inspection “cadre” 
should be further grown and developed. 
4.  Add mechanisms to augment FDA oversight through recognition of independent inspec-
tions or audits. Ideally, the FDA would have sufficient funding and capacity to conduct all 
needed inspections of manufacturing plants that make drugs and drug products for the U.S. 
market. Because this is an ideal that might take years to realize, the FDA should also consider 
alternate mechanisms for achieving sufficient oversight. There are several possible models for 
independent inspections or audits:
a.  The FDA recognizes inspections by selected foreign regulatory agencies. The FDA’s current 
authority to do this may not be clearly delineated in statute.
b.  The FDA accredits independent third-party inspectors whose fees are paid by the FDA and 
supported by industry user fees. 
c.  The FDA accredits third-party inspectors whose fees are paid directly by industry. Such a 
system was created for Medical Device plants under the Medical Device User Fee Act of 2002. 
  Recognizing foreign agency inspections that the FDA considers equivalent to its own could spare 
significant FDA resources. The FDA could also use available resources to develop guidelines, and 
train and certify third-party inspectors, whose costs could be supported either through pooled 
industry user fees or by direct payment by industry. Option (c) may create a potential conflict of 
interest, as manufacturers are requesting and paying directly for the inspections. Ultimately, the 
FDA and HHS should have the discretion to recognize third-party inspections if they determine 
them to be necessary to achieve a sufficient level of oversight. The Food Safety Modernization Act 
establishes a third-party accreditation program for oversight of food production facilities.451
5.  Make explicit through statute the extraterritorial applicability of the FDCA. The U.S.  
Supreme Court has upheld the legal principle that Congress must express clear legislative intent 
for statute to apply to entities overseas. The FDA’s authority to oversee foreign plants making 
drugs and ingredients for the United States is insufficiently delineated in statute, and could allow 
for challenges to the agency’s inspection activities for foreign sites. 
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2.  Establish individual accountability for product quality and safety. To permit meaningful en-
forcement, responsible corporate officials should be clearly responsible for ensuring manufactur-
ing sites, including those of suppliers, comply with quality standards. Within companies, specific 
responsible individuals should be personally accountable for the quality and safety of drugs and 
active ingredients that reach U.S. patients. As noted previously, similar controls already exist for 
medical devices,454 and comprehensive requirements exist for a “qualified person” to assume 
responsibility for the safety of drugs and active ingredients in the E.U.455
G. Improve Fda access to information from other regulatory bodies and industry
1.  Require manufacturers, including OTC manufacturers, to inform the FDA of instances 
where exposure to a drug product may result in illness or injury. All manufacturers should 
report contamination or failure to meet specifications in distributed products (currently not 
required of OTC manufacturers that are not subject to marketing applications), and should also 
report suspected counterfeiting and theft. Access to this information by the FDA should be a legal 
requirement and is paramount when a potentially harmful product may reach the public. Im-
proved reporting requirements will ensure that the FDA has the best knowledge about drugs that 
may be adulterated, counterfeit or otherwise harmful and can fulfill its public health mandate.
2.  Allow the FDA to confidentially exchange information on manufacturing safety with other 
countries and government entities. Global expansion of manufacturing increases the impor-
tance of information-sharing between regulatory bodies. In some cases, entities are reluctant to 
provide the FDA with sensitive data because the FDA is subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act, which could make those data public. Congress must allow the FDA to accept information 
in a manner that protects that information from public disclosure, and also to share information 
currently protected under the trade secrets provision of the FDCA.
3.  Whistle-blower protections. Industry employees who have information on events that may 
threaten the public health must be able to share that information with the government or their 
supervisors without risk. Protections should prohibit retaliation by the whistle-blower’s employ-
ers, and should permit adequate remedies if retaliation does occur.
3.   Allow the FDA to refuse entry of a product if the site at which it was manufactured has 
refused an FDA inspection. This will help the agency ensure that potentially compromised 
products do not enter the United States and will incentivize foreign manufacturers to allow the 
FDA to access plants and facilities.
4.   Require importer registration. Tracking importers through a registration system will be an im-
portant element of supply chain transparency and will offer a framework for importers to provide 
more comprehensive documentation. 
5.   Permit the FDA to require more comprehensive documentation at import. The FDA should 
have the authority to require parties importing drugs and ingredients into the United States to 
provide more substantive information during the importation process. Documentation could also 
demonstrate compliance with U.S. requirements on product identity, quality, safety, FDA ap-
proval and FDA registration, as well as other categories at the discretion of the FDA. 
e. ensure the Fda has the regulatory authorities it needs to fulfill its mission  
1.  Provide the FDA with the authority to require drug recalls and order the cessation of dis-
tribution in situations where a drug product could cause illness or injury. Mandatory recall 
authority will help the FDA ensure patients are not exposed to harmful products, and will also 
act as an important deterrent to refusing or delaying appropriate action. The FDA may order a 
recall of medical devices, but may not do so for drugs, a significant limitation to its authority. 
2.  Provide the FDA with the power of subpoena. The ability to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments will help the FDA quickly investigate issues of medical product quality and safety that may 
harm the public. 
F.  Strengthen the Fda’s enforcement ability through tougher penalties and clearer accountabil-
ity for industry
1.  Strengthen both criminal and civil penalties for violations of the FDCA. With some excep-
tions, current FDCA criminal penalties for knowing adulteration, misbranding and counterfeiting 
of drugs are a maximum of $10,000 or three years in prison. Both financial penalties and al-
lowable prison terms should be increased for criminal violations, including drug and ingredient 
adulteration caused knowingly or through negligence. Creating new administrative civil penalties 
for violations of the FDCA will also help deter noncompliance and will give the FDA a much 
more flexible enforcement arsenal. Currently for drugs, the FDA may assess civil penalties only 
for violations of certain application requirements in the FDCA.
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3.1 Overview
The risk of stolen or counterfeit products reaching patients through the drug distribution system is 
small, but real. Pharmaceuticals move from manufacturer to patient through a variety of pathways. Most 
commonly, the product moves from a manufacturer to a major wholesaler to a pharmacy or hospital, 
which dispenses the drug to a patient. Manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies have taken steps to 
reduce the opportunity for drug diversion in recent years, but risks persist. Federal and state regulations 
are inconsistent, and no national system for tracking or validating drugs exists. 
Numerous entities are involved in drug distribution, and the routes to market can be circuitous. Drugs 
can be bought and sold by wholesalers and their subsidiaries that move whole or partial lots, repackage 
or relabel product and/or handle importation. Drugs may be traded between distributors, and may travel 
back from distributors and pharmacies in local markets to major wholesalers through sales or returns 
before ultimately reaching patients. Distributors may also provide logistics services to manufacturers 
without actually purchasing lots of a drug; that is, the physical movement of drugs does not always 
conform to transfers of ownership, further complicating legitimate drug tracking. 
In the United States, most drugs sold by manufacturers move initially through the three large national 
wholesalers: McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health and AmerisourceBergen, which collectively generated 85 
percent of revenues in the drug wholesale market in 2010.456 These major wholesalers, as well as large 
regional wholesalers, sell to national pharmacy chains, hospitals or smaller “secondary” wholesalers. 
Secondary wholesalers often supply small hospitals, clinics and pharmacies that are unable to purchase 
pharmaceuticals in the large quantities sold by national and regional wholesalers. Similarly, small whole-
salers may purchase product from regional or national distributors because they are unable to meet 
minimum requirements for purchase directly from the manufacturer. There were an estimated 7,000 sec-
ondary wholesalers in the United States in 2003,457 down to fewer than 1,803 by 2007. 458,* Wholesale 
trade of pharmaceuticals is not always unidirectional. For example, wholesalers sell to other wholesalers 
discounted products that they acquire from manufacturer clearances or pharmacy or wholesaler over-
stocks.459 In some cases, products travel from small wholesalers back into the distribution chain through 
national or regional wholesalers. In 2001, the National Wholesale Druggists Association—the trade 
association for major distributors (now called the Healthcare Distribution Management Association, or 
* The trend is principally attributable to a shift in the business model away from wholesaler arbitrage of rising drug prices, a practice that accounted for up 
to 40 percent of wholesaler margin. The 2007 U.S. Census reported 1,803 U.S. wholesalers of prescription drugs, which would also include national and 
regional wholesalers.
PHARMACEUTICAL DISTRIBUTION C H A P T E R3
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CaSe Study 6
MedICaId druGS PurCHaSed on tHe StreetS and  
reSold Into dIStrIButIon
Two men were convicted in 2008 for selling diverted Medicaid drugs back into distribution, where 
the drugs ultimately reached pharmacies and unsuspecting patients.468 According to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Florida, a man named Michael Manno purchased the 
drugs—including medicines for treating cancer and controlling cholesterol, as well as human growth 
hormone—from Medicaid patients in new York.469 Manno, based in new Jersey, sold the drugs to 
Patrick Bronder in Boca Raton, Florida.470
Manno and Bronder made more than $6.8 million by selling the drugs to a Florida wholesaler, 
who eventually sold the diverted drugs to pharmacies that dispensed them to patients.471 Patients 
receiving the drugs were unaware that these medicines already had been dispensed to someone 
else, held under potentially unsafe conditions, and then issued to them as if they were a safe and 
legitimate product.472
This example of diversion of prescription drugs from the street, which took place in 2001 and 
2002,473 is not unique. In 2010, three men were indicted for distributing prescription drugs without 
a license.474 Between 2002 and 2005, the defendants allegedly purchased drugs from the street and 
from other unlicensed sources.475 The men allegedly used these drugs to fill orders they solicited 
from pharmacies. By shipping the diverted medicine through a licensed wholesaler in Texas, they 
grossed more than $13 million.476
HDMA)—reported to the FDA that up to 4 percent of the products handled by its members came from 
sources other than manufacturers.460 While it is only a small proportion of total sales, this represents a 
substantial absolute volume. According to HDMA, to its knowledge, the practice of a large wholesaler 
purchasing from secondary wholesalers no longer occurs.461 
3.2 Drug diversion and counterfeit drugs in 
u.S. distribution
3.2.1 Diversion, counterfeiting and theft are ongoing problems in the  
United States
The complex distribution system outlined above creates opportunities for stolen or counterfeit drugs to 
enter legitimate channels of distribution. One frequently documented drug-diversion scheme is illicit 
procurement of government-subsidized medicine for resale into the market. In 2008, there were two 
federal convictions involving human growth hormone products that were purchased from Medicaid pa-
tients on the streets of New York and resold into distribution with false documentation.462 In 2010, three 
men were indicted for allegedly illicitly purchasing prescription drugs—some directly from patients—
and selling them to pharmacies through a licensed wholesaler in Texas (see case study 6).463  In order to 
conceal a medicine’s original provenance, drug diverters commonly remove existing labels with various 
organic solvents and replace them with counterfeit labels (see figure 15).
Figure 15
Lighter fluid and other solvents are used to remove 
pharmacy labels prior to reintroduction of diverted 
drugs into the wholesale distribution system. These were 
discovered during a warranted search of an unlicensed 
warehouse in Miami, Florida. 
Source: Cesar Arias, RPh, Stone Cold Healthcare Consultants.  
Image used with permission.
As distinct from diverted drugs, outright counterfeits—products that imitate the dosage or packaging of 
a licensed manufacturer—may also enter regular distribution channels. In 2001, counterfeit Serostim®, 
a human growth hormone used to treat AIDS-related wasting, was found in at least seven states and 
passed through multiple wholesalers.464–466 (The manufacturer of Serostim® has since put in place a 
secured distribution program, with a unique serial number assigned to each vial that must be verified by 
the dispensing pharmacy.)467
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CaSe Study 7
a CounterFeIt InjeCtaBle druG eludeS traCkInG 
Epogen® is a high-cost injectable drug used to treat anemia. A counterfeit version was sold into 
legitimate distribution in 2002, resulting in subtherapeutic dosing and, reportedly, severe, painful 
side effects. Criminals in Florida relabeled up to 110,000 bottles of low-dose Epogen® (2,000 units/
mL) to create a counterfeit high-dose (40,000 units/mL) Epogen® and a similar drug, Procrit®.492 They 
acquired at least some of the low-dose Epogen® from a Florida pharmacy that falsified records to 
indicate that local patients had purchased the drugs.493 By one calculation, the relabeling of low-
dose Epogen® to resemble a stronger product yielded the criminals a $46 million profit.494 
The counterfeit high-dose drugs passed through several registered and unregistered intermedi-
aries495 before a portion was allegedly sold to a national wholesaler.496 Although federal statute 
requires smaller wholesalers to track the drugs they buy and sell, those listed as authorized distribu-
tors by manufacturers, most often the larger distributors, are exempt from the requirement (see 
section 3.3.2).497 Thus, the provenance of products entering an exempted wholesaler’s warehouses 
would not be passed on to subsequent purchasers. The counterfeit drugs were eventually sold to 
patients by a major chain drugstore.498
Recovering from a liver transplant, 19-year old Tim Fagan of new York499 received counterfeit  
Epogen,® and cancer patient Maxine Blount500 received counterfeit Procrit®. These patients and  
others received lower levels of life-preserving therapy than they needed, and they suffered painful 
side effects. According to his father’s testimony, Tim Fagan endured excruciating side effects every 
time he injected the counterfeit medication.501 
FDA investigators were able to recover less than 10 percent of the counterfeit medicine;502 more 
than 90,000 vials may have reached patients.
 
Counterfeits may originate wholly outside the regulated system, or they may be illicitly procured medi-
cines that have been diluted, falsely labeled or otherwise adulterated and sold by unauthorized entities. 
In 2002, counterfeit high-dose Epogen® (see case study 7) was actually low-dose Epogen® that had been 
relabeled to resemble a higher strength, and successfully sold to legitimate distributors and pharmacies.
Overt pharmaceutical theft, particularly cargo theft, is a substantial problem, with a number of reports 
of patient adverse events from stolen drugs—likely due to improper storage and handling.477 In 2009, 
thieves stole 129,000 vials of insulin and likely stored them under improper conditions, according to an 
FDA report.478 According to an FDA affidavit, the stolen drugs resurfaced at retail chain pharmacies in 
Texas, Georgia and Kentucky. 479 The stolen goods were sold by at least three wholesalers before reaching 
pharmacies.480 One of the wholesalers was discovered to have additional stolen and diverted goods.481 
Two months after this crime was discovered, the FDA had recovered only 2 percent of the missing  
vials.482 In March 2010, more than $70 million worth of pharmaceuticals was stolen from an Eli Lilly  
& Co. warehouse in Connecticut483—the single-largest cargo theft on record.484 The fate of these stolen 
drugs has not been determined. 
Although there were fewer pharmaceutical cargo thefts in the first six months of 2009 than in the same 
period in 2008, the average value of loss increased dramatically from $704,685 to $6.7 million.485 The 
average loss value in 2010 was $3.78 million, which was the highest average loss value of all stolen com-
modities that year.486 
A 2006 report by the FDA’s Counterfeit Drug Task Force expresses concern that U.S. drug distribution 
may be increasingly vulnerable to the introduction of sophisticated counterfeits.487 During fiscal year 
2010, the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations opened 72 counterfeiting cases—more than in any 
prior year.488 Fiscal year 2009 had also been a record for counterfeit investigations with 65 cases (see 
figure 16).489 In 2006–2007, the first year after Florida enacted new legislation to improve the safety of 
distribution, Florida’s Diversion Response Team opened 50 new cases on drug diversion.490
Source: FDA.491
Figure 16
Counterfeit cases opened by the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations, 
1997–2009
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Figure 1
Counterfeit cases opened by FDA’s Office of Criminal 
Investigation, FYs 1997–20010
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SIdeBar 3
Parallel IMPortatIon, reIMPortatIon and PerSonal 
IMPortatIon
In many jurisdictions, individual consumers or commercial entities purchase prescription drugs 
across national borders to take advantage of cost differences created by local market conditions or 
price controls. Three terms commonly describe forms of importation:
Parallel importation: most often used to refer to the legal, commercial importation of drugs 
from a foreign country, as long as the drug is legally marketed in both the country of export and 
the country of import. Parallel importation is legal in the European Union but is not legal in the 
United States.
reimportation: normally used in the U.S. context, refers to the importation of drugs from a for-
eign country that were made for that foreign country market. (The term reimportation is applied 
because in some cases the drugs have been manufactured in the United States and exported.)
Personal importation: noncommercial reimportation by individuals. These purchases often occur 
online.
neither parallel importation nor reimportation is legal in the United States. Although the FDA 
cannot verify the safety of any drug purchased outside of the U.S. market, written FDA procedures 
recommend against prosecution for personal importation in certain situations.513 For an individual 
patient unable to afford drugs in the United States, the potential to obtain identical products at 
lower cost is understandably attractive. Congress has considered legislation to legalize large-scale, 
cross-border purchasing of drugs from select countries, subject to FDA oversight.514 Were such a 
provision enacted, safety questions would arise from the risk that a large volume of cross-border 
demand could exceed local supply, providing motivation for unscrupulous sellers to source prod-
ucts from unapproved third-party countries. It would be essential that the FDA had the resources 
and capacity to fulfill its safety mandate. 
3.2.2 Risks originating outside the United States
The U.S. drug supply also is vulnerable to counterfeit drugs produced overseas, smuggled into the Unit-
ed States and sold into normal distribution. Estimates of counterfeit drugs in other parts of the world 
run as high as 30 percent.503 In 2003, counterfeit Lipitor® from Central America was illegally imported 
and sold into U.S. distribution.504 In 2009, a Chinese national was sentenced to prison for distributing 
counterfeit and misbranded pharmaceuticals in the United States. His counterfeits contained low levels 
of active ingredient, and many had impurities.505 
As international pharmaceutical trade grows, traders may take advantage of free-trade zones where scru-
tiny of broker and trader behaviors is low, thereby enabling, for example, the repackaging or relabeling 
of products to conceal their origins, according to the World Health Organization.506 This practice may 
help hide the provenance of counterfeit drugs as well as drugs and drug ingredients that are not made 
at approved manufacturing sites, as discussed in section 1.3.2. Wholesalers and pharmacies that use or 
are willing to ignore these suspicious chains of custody risk passing on potentially unsafe products to 
consumers. 
Online pharmacies are another way that problematic products can make their way into the United 
States. While not examined in depth in this paper, there is no doubt that by indiscriminately purchasing 
drugs from online sources, consumers expose themselves to a large safety risk. While many legitimate 
online pharmacies exist, there have also been documented sales of counterfeit, diverted, misbranded or 
adulterated medicine through online pharmacies. In the summer of 2010, the FDA alerted the public 
that counterfeit Tamiflu® was being sold online.507 When the FDA staff ordered samples of the advertised 
antiviral drugs, they received a shipment from India. The agency determined that the medicine con-
tained the wrong active ingredient, and that this substituted material, similar to penicillin, could cause 
severe reactions in allergic patients.508 In March 2009, the FDA discovered that consumers received 
counterfeit Xenical®, an FDA-approved diet drug, from at least two different Web sites. The counterfeits 
did not contain any active drug.509 In the spring of 2009, a man in Dallas was convicted of buying and 
selling counterfeits online. The counterfeits were traced to China.510 In November 2009, the FDA issued 
22 warning letters to online pharmacies that appeared to be selling unapproved or misbranded drugs to 
U.S. consumers.511 
The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) has created the Verified Internet Pharmacy 
Practice Sites (VIPPS), an accreditation program for U.S.-based pharmacies to guide consumers to safe 
online options.512 
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which is easily falsifiable, and many standards exempt large wholesalers from tracking requirements, 
as does federal law (see section 3.3.2). In addition, industry concerns about commercial confidentiality 
have meant that some state laws, such as Florida’s, allow redaction of certain information from pedigrees. 
Within its model rules on the Licensure for Wholesale Distributors, NABP suggests that state boards of 
pharmacy eventually require all entities involved in distribution (manufacturers, wholesalers and phar-
macies) to maintain and pass pedigrees for the medical products they distribute.518 
Furthermore, most state laws pertaining to tracking do not require companies to track bottles or pack-
ages of drugs (the drug “unit”), instead allowing tracking by the drug “lot,” a nonstandardized metric 
that provides low-resolution data and possibly represents thousands of product units. Often a full lot of 
drugs does not travel in one shipment, so if that one shipment is stolen, the entire lot is compromised: if 
any portion of a given lot of drugs is stolen, patients in possession of units from one lot cannot know if 
they have potentially substandard product. When stolen insulin was discovered in Texas in 2009, these 
units were readily identified because the stolen goods happened to comprise three complete lots.519 Had 
the stolen material compromised only part of a lot, there would have been no way to distinguish legiti-
mate products from stolen and potentially compromised drugs. 
SIdeBar 4
reGulatIon oF Controlled SuBStanCeS By tHe u.S. 
druG enForCeMent adMInIStratIon (dea) 
Although not a focus of this paper, the diversion of controlled substances for nonmedical use is an 
important issue with serious public health consequences. Many controlled substances are particular 
targets for theft and diversion because of black market demand. The DEA has established special 
distribution and tracking requirements to address systematic diversion of controlled substances into 
the black market or other illegal channels, as well as illicit procurement of controlled drugs by pa-
tients. All manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies that make or distribute controlled substances 
must register with the DEA,520 and may only trade a controlled substance with another registered 
entity. Each transaction is authorized by a special form issued by the DEA,521 which names the 
parties to the transaction, their registration numbers, and a product description and amount.522–524 
Manufacturers and distributors are also required to report transactions of controlled substances to 
the DEA through the Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS).525 The DEA 
uses this information to identify suspicious transactions and diversion.526
 
3.3 Barriers to drug tracking and oversight 
of distribution 
3.3.1 Limits of current drug tracking requirements 
Drug distribution occurs nationally or regionally, but wholesalers are registered and regulated at the state 
level, usually through the state’s board of pharmacy. The FDA and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration investigate suspected illegal activity by wholesalers and pharmacies when it crosses state lines, 
but states are responsible for most compliance oversight. Both state and federal investigative resources 
are limited. Controlled drugs, it should be noted, are subject to separate requirements (see sidebar 4).
In the early 2000s, wholesaler licensure requirements in many states were minimal, presenting attractive 
opportunities to individuals willing to abuse the system for profit. In particular, Miami Dade County, 
Florida, was associated with a number of high-profile diversion cases in the early 2000s (see case study 
7). To the dismay of law-abiding secondary wholesalers, insufficient regulation, combined with large 
financial incentives, encouraged the proliferation of bad actors, seriously eroding trust in the secondary 
market. 
To address this criminal activity, many states have endeavored to tighten their wholesaler licensure 
requirements, in some cases based on best-practice standards established by the NABP.515 As of February 
2011, 29 states (as well as the federal government) have established pedigree requirements, according 
to HDMA.516 To address shortfalls in drug tracking, the laws require entities involved in distribution 
to maintain “pedigrees,” or transaction histories, of the products they sell. (The intent of a pedigree 
requirement is to make the concealment of illicit activity more difficult by increasing transparency, and 
to support enforcement of responsible purchasing by wholesalers and pharmacies. Weak or nonexistent 
tracking systems make it difficult to find stolen merchandise and to implement recalls, when necessary. 
For example, the California Department of Public Health estimated that 7,832 patients in the state were 
exposed to adulterated heparin after the recalls were issued because of communication failures among 
wholesalers, hospitals, hospital pharmacies and the manufacturer.517 
Despite efforts at the state level, weaknesses in regulation remain. Varying state laws make compliance 
more complicated for companies operating in more than one state. Wholesalers licensed in states with 
weaker oversight may still sell nationally, often without having to meet additional, possibly more strin-
gent, requirements of other states. Most state pedigree standards allow for paper-based documentation,* 
* Colorado, Oregon and California are the only states that require electronic pedigrees. Colorado’s requirement only applies to transactions outside of the 
“Normal Supply Chain”—a direct pathway from manufacturer to authorized distributor to pharmacy.
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the agency attempted to hold to a 2006 date, secondary wholesalers filed a lawsuit to stop the action. 
A U.S. district court granted a stay on grounds that the FDA’s rule was inconsistent with the authorized 
distributor exemption. The court also expressed concern that the FDA rule promotes anticompetitive 
behavior because of this apparent inequity toward smaller wholesalers.539 The rule is still not in effect. 
3.3.3 Electronic tracking system proposals
Changes in wholesaler purchasing practice suggest that large ADRs generally no longer purchase medi-
cines from other wholesalers. However, lack of a uniform and comprehensive federal pedigree standard 
(the PDMA) and the varying strength of pedigree requirements in states have driven regulators and 
members of industry to seek new federal standards to better ensure distribution safety and security as 
well as facilitate compliance. Some are looking to address pedigree limitations through new electronic 
“track-and-trace” systems. Under these systems, manufacturers would apply electronically readable tags 
at the product unit level (the smallest package or container sold to a pharmacy or hospital). By scanning 
the tags, wholesalers and pharmacies would be able to verify the legitimate origins of the drugs they pur-
chase. Each time the tagged unit is transferred and scanned, new electronic data would be generated and 
stored (see sidebar 5). Electronic unit-level tracking by all entities involved in distribution could help 
create a more secure tracking system, and facilitate more targeted responses to theft, adulteration and 
counterfeiting. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) requires the FDA to develop standards for 
the tracking and tracing of drugs, although the FDAAA did not place a time line on this requirement.540 
The FDA held a workshop for industry stakeholders on the parameters of a track-and-trace system in 
February 2011. Thus, while the development of standards specified in the FDAAA is under way, it is 
unclear whether the FDA can require compliance without additional statutory authority. Recently, both 
the U.S. Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Inter-agency Working Group and the office of the United States 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator have recommended implementation of a track-and-trace 
system to secure drug distribution against counterfeits.541,542
Not every stakeholder embraces the idea of track-and-trace systems. According to a report commis-
sioned by two pharmacy trade associations, implementation of track-and-trace at the retail level will 
entail an inordinately high cost for pharmacies that would not be warranted by the rare incidence of 
counterfeit drugs found in normal U.S. distribution channels.543 Critics of this report say it examines 
only the most onerous option of many track-and-trace system proposals—and that it also explicitly 
ignores efficiencies or cost savings that could result from such a system.544 Despite industry disagree-
ment on track-and-trace, recent examples of stolen products appearing on the shelves of U.S. pharma-
cies, such as insulin in 2009 (see section 3.2.1), are evidence of an ongoing problem. Any solution will 
require the participation and cooperation of the pharmacy sector. 
3.3.2 The Prescription Drug Marketing Act 
In 1988, Congress passed the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) to improve regulation of drug 
distribution and address drug diversion. Key PDMA provisions include:
■ a prohibition of sale or trade of any drugs purchased by hospitals and clinics;527 
■  a requirement that HHS establish guidelines for states on minimum wholesaler licensure require-
ments,528 which have since been codified through regulations;529 and 
■  a requirement that entities involved in pharmaceutical distribution maintain pedigrees for the 
products they sell.530 
A 1992 amendment to the PDMA further expanded the scope of information required in pedigrees.531 
These measures sought to increase transparency during distribution and to make concealment of illicit 
activity more difficult. However, the PDMA pedigree requirement is limited in scope, in that it applies 
almost exclusively to secondary wholesalers while exempting wholesalers that have ongoing purchas-
ing agreements with pharmaceutical manufacturers.532 These “authorized distributors of record” (ADRs) 
include the three major national wholesalers (McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health and AmerisourceBergen) 
and the approximately 30 regional wholesalers.* Requiring pedigrees only from secondary wholesal-
ers assumes that diverted or counterfeit product never moves through the hands of major distributors. 
History has shown this not always to be the case (see case study 7). Moreover, when ADRs purchase 
product from entities other than manufacturers (although this is now rare), their exemption from track-
ing requirements effectively clears any existing pedigree from the record—a data gap that can conceal 
problematic distribution histories from subsequent purchasers.
In addition to these weaknesses, meaningful implementation of the pedigree provision has been indefi-
nitely delayed by a court-ordered injunction—the result of a lawsuit filed by secondary wholesalers.533 
The PDMA requires all entities engaged in distribution, except manufacturers and ADRs, to provide 
transaction histories along with the drugs they sell.534 Early implementation guidance from the FDA 
suggested that these pedigrees reflect transactions back to the manufacturer or the ADR.535 The FDA’s 
stated intention regarding this guidance was that distributors should report transactions back to the ADR 
that originally purchased the drugs from the manufacturer.536 In the years after PDMA passage, however, 
many smaller non-ADR wholesalers tracked back only to the most recent sale by any authorized distrib-
utor.537 The FDA attempted to remedy this gap in pedigree requirements in a final rule issued in 1999 
that required transaction histories back to the manufacturer. However, this move met with opposition 
by smaller wholesalers who asserted that they would not be able to comply because the exemption of 
authorized distributors rendered it impossible for them to obtain reliable sales histories all the way back 
to the manufacturer.538 The effective date of the 1999 rule was delayed five times by the FDA, and when 
* Based on the number of regional or specialty wholesalers that are members of HDMA, excluding McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health and 
AmerisourceBergen. Being an ADR is a requirement for active HDMA membership. Some secondary wholesalers are also ADRs for certain products.
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3.4 Pew conference and policy 
recommendations
Despite actions by industry and regulators, counterfeit and diverted products continue to enter the U.S. 
distribution market, a complex system involving many companies. To better secure distribution, as well 
as to greatly increase the effectiveness of drug recalls, drug tracking must be improved and regulation of 
distribution strengthened.
Participants at the Pew Health Group roundtable recognized that counterfeit and stolen drugs have been 
able to enter the legitimate U.S. distribution system, and that this ongoing risk must be addressed. A 
number of participants referred to the current benefits of a closed distribution system, from manufactur-
er to distributor to pharmacy. However, one state regulator gave a 2010 example of a counterfeit product 
discovered at a chain retail location that purchased its products from a national wholesaler, suggesting 
that even an apparently closed supply chain would benefit from measures to secure distribution.
There was broad agreement among participants that the United States needs uniform national standards 
for licensure of pharmaceutical wholesalers to overcome a patchwork of sometimes lax state require-
ments. One pharmacy representative said that additional certification or some additional accountability 
for distributors is necessary so that, if a pharmacy needs to turn to an alternate supplier for product, it 
will have some assurance that the distributor is legitimate.
In addition to wholesaler licensure improvements, many participants also supported a national drug 
traceability system. However, retail pharmacy representatives expressed concerns about implementation 
costs and had questions about how a track-and-trace system would be operationalized at the pharmacy 
level. If track-and-trace were to be required, however, most participants, including pharmacy trade asso-
ciation representatives, expressed a preference for uniform national standards rather than state-by-state 
regulations. 
Regulators, manufacturer representatives, large and small distributors, and consumer groups supported 
nationally applied serialization and electronic tagging systems to track drugs. The FDA would like to 
see a system that includes tracking and traceability for all components throughout the supply chain. 
Just like other products contain a bar code that can be scanned for information, drugs should be able to 
carry the same type of identifier. Wholesalers agreed to a need for a tracking system, noting that small 
distributors are able to pass pedigree now, without a great cost burden. Participants noted that such a 
system has been under discussion for many years, but that agreement on uniform standards has not 
been reached. The majority of participants who voiced an opinion believe that implementing such a 
system will require a new federal statute. 
 
SIdeBar 5
wHat IS “traCk-and-traCe”?
Any system to allow automated drug tracking requires two distinct, but related, technological 
components. First, each individual unit to be tracked must have a unique identification—or serial-
ization—number. Second, the system requires an efficient means of embedding and reading these 
numbers as products move through the distribution supply chain. 
Serializing drug products at the unit, or package, level would permit tracking of drugs at a much 
more granular level than the current lot level. In 2010, the FDA released a final guidance on a 
standard form for serial numbers, suggesting that the number be an alphanumeric code of up to 20 
digits following the product’s national drug code.545 The FDA states in its guidance that this “serial-
ized national drug code” is compatible with existing serialization systems such as the Global Trade 
Item numbers system put forward by the GS1, a nonprofit standards-setting organization.546 
For a functioning track-and-trace system, serial numbers would be embedded in an electroni-
cally readable tag, allowing wholesalers and pharmacies to scan serialized products as they move 
through their facilities. Most track-and-trace requirements, such as those included in California’s 
pedigree law, are technology-neutral, meaning they do not specify how the serial number will be 
applied or recorded. However, there are two principal technologies in use: 2-D bar codes and 
RFID.* The latter approach offers an advantage over bar codes in that the tags can be read through 
packaging. Drug units are often packaged together for bulk shipping, and entities authenticating 
units serialized by bar code must either rely solely on an overall shipment tag (and infer the validity 
of the product within, which is a lower measure of confidence), or must open the shipping case to 
scan individual units. One limitation to RFID is the potential for interference between frequencies 
to affect read rates, according to a 2006 pilot of the technology by Cardinal Health, a national drug 
distributor.547 RFID is also a costlier tagging system than 2-D bar codes, although its price continues 
to decrease.548 
In addition to serialization and electronic tagging, a third critical parameter to track-and-trace is an 
effective data management system (or systems) that will house transaction information, and which 
wholesalers and pharmacies may query to check a product’s transaction history.
* Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology  uses electronic tags and readers to pass data through radio waves.
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d.  If the system requires the passage of a more traditional “pedigree” document, these documents 
should be electronic to better protect against falsification. 
B. Strengthen wholesaler regulation and oversight
1.  Improve standards for wholesaler licensure and oversight. Federal guidance on minimum 
standards for wholesaler licensure should be strengthened to include a requirement for pre-li-
censure warehouse inspections, whether by federal or state officials, and for periodic inspections 
thereafter. Standards should also include required background checks for individuals in charge 
of wholesale operations prior to licensure. These principles are also included in the robust re-
quirements for wholesaler licensure set forth in the NABP model rules. In the absence of stronger 
federal requirements, states should independently strengthen wholesaler licensure requirements 
where necessary to conform to these principles.549 
2.  Require distributors and pharmacies to alert the FDA of any suspected product adultera-
tion, counterfeiting, diversion or theft. Distributors and pharmacies should also report to 
the FDA any case in which they are unable to validate the transaction history of a drug. As with 
manufacturers, distributors are not required to report this information to the FDA; any sharing 
is done on a voluntary basis. FDA access to this information must be the priority when there is a 
public health risk of exposure to a potentially harmful product.   
One concern expressed by pharmacy groups in particular was data security within a track-and-trace 
system. The representative from the National Association of Chain Drug Stores also noted that pharmacy 
inventory information has a proprietary value, which retailers worry could be threatened under a nation-
al system that permits others to access such data. This representative suggested that pilot projects could 
provide an early sense of how data would move between groups, and said that if track-and-trace were 
put in place, peer-to-peer authentication may be most appropriate. In this scenario, participants would 
only check a product with their immediate trading partner rather than providing visibility all the way 
back to the manufacturer. One wholesaler representative preferred a de-identified system, in which users 
could query the system with a given serial number and receive a green or red light to signal acceptable 
or not acceptable without revealing company information. 
Finally, several participants expressed concern about the costs of implementing a stronger, more uniform 
system, particularly representatives from small pharmacies, who cautioned that some don’t even have In-
ternet access, so technology would need to be made accessible and cost effective for these stakeholders.
PolICy reCoMMendatIonS*
a. Improve drug distribution security through a federal serialization and verification system
1.  Require each drug package to bear a unique serial number. Drugs should be serialized at the 
level of the smallest container from which a drug may be repackaged or dispensed (also called a 
“unit”). Repackagers should be required to re-serialize product and link new serial numbers to 
original serial numbers. 
2.  Create a uniform federal system for verification of distribution transaction history. Requir-
ing verification of a drug’s transaction history—as well as the systems necessary to support that 
verification—will enable responsible purchasing and provide an important tool to regulators 
investigating issues of counterfeiting, diversion and theft.  
a.  The system must apply to all entities involved in distribution. Requiring all manufacturers,      
wholesalers and pharmacies to participate in a federal pedigree system through a new federal 
law or revisions to existing law will ensure that bad actors have no clear regulatory exception 
to abuse. 
b. Regulators must be able to access full transaction histories for any drug when needed. 
c.  Strong consideration should be given to implementation of an entirely electronic system, 
wherein serial numbers are embedded into electronic tags that may be scanned by each entity 
to authenticate the transaction history of a product. 
* The recommendations in this report have been informed by the roundtable discussions and presentations, but are not intended to constitute a consensus 
position and may not reflect the views of every participating organization.
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  Guy villax, Board Member of the European Fine Chemicals Group and of Rx-360; 
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2:30–3:05 p.m. Roundtable Discussion 
Key Questions: 1. How frequently should the FDA inspect foreign plants?
 2. Is there a role for third-party inspections?
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manufacturing sites? How can tracking systems integrate with risk 
assessment and Customs activity?
3:05–3:15 p.m. Q&A 
3:30–4:30 p.m. Session 3: Ensuring a robust regulatory system 
Panelists: Heather Bresch, MBa, President, Mylan Inc.
  Prabir Basu, Phd, Executive Director, national Institute for Pharmaceutical 
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 2. Does the FDA need new tools to oversee global supply chains?
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part of the solution?
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5:15–5:25 p.m. Concluding Remarks    allan Coukell, Pew Health Group
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ADR Authorized Distributor of Record
ANDA Abbreviated new Drug Application
API Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient
CBP United States Customs and Border Protection
CDC  United States Centers for Disease Control  
and Prevention
CDER  Center for Drug Evaluation and Research  
(Food and Drug Administration)
COA Certificate of Analysis 
DEA United States Drug Enforcement Administration
DEG Diethylene Glycol
DMF Drug Master File
EMA European Medicines Agency
EU European Union
FDA United States Food and Drug Administration
FDAAA Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
FDCA Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
GAO United States Government Accountability Office
GMP Good Manufacturing Practice
HHS  United States Department of Health and  
Human Services
ICH  International Conference on Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
NDA new Drug Application
OCI  Office of Criminal Investigations (Food and  
Drug Administration)
ORA  Office of Regulatory Affairs (Food and Drug 
Administration)
OSCS Oversulfated Chondroitin Sulfate
OTC Over-the-Counter
PAI Pre-Approval Inspection 
PDMA Prescription Drug Marketing Act
PDUFA Prescription Drug User Fee Act
QSR Quality Systems Regulation 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
SFDA Chinese State Food and Drug Administration
TGA Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration
USP United States Pharmacopeial Convention
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